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"In much of literature the idea of an ethical lawyer is regarded as a
contradiction in terms."'
"But isn't legal ethics an oxymoron?" 2
It would seem that only lawyers take legal ethics seriously. 3 A majority of
* As noted in the title, this Article concerns only civil appellate practice. For example,
an attorney's duty to refuse to appeal a frivolous case, a duty well-established in the civil
appellate practice, is considerably modified in the context of the court-appointed criminal
counsel. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988); Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967); Note, Withdrawal of Appointed Counsel from Frivolous Indigent Appeals, 49
IND. L.J. 740 (1974). Criminal cases will therefore only be used as illustrations when the basic
issue would not vary from the civil to the criminal context. The ABA has separately
promulgated detailed guidelines for both prosecutors and defense counsel in its STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980). Although the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) have been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions,
a substantial number still enforce the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code). This Article discusses both sets of ethical rules, as officially promulgated by the
American Bar Association. In most instances relevant to this Article, the Model Rules and the
Model Code provide identical results. Where a divergence exists, the Article so notes.
For literary references to lawyers, see D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 1-
15 (1973); Joyner, Law School and Legal Ethics-A Part of the Illness or the Cure?, 60 OKLA.
B.J. 743 (1989). Shakespeare's classic plan of action, "the first thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers," (King Henry VI, act IV, scene ii, line 86), is not alone in its disdain for the legal
profession. Ambrose Bierce, in his DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 75 (Dover ed. 1958), once defined a
lawyer as "one skilled in the circumvention of the law." The great satirist Jonathan Swift, in
his Gulliver's Travels, caustically noted:
It is likewise to be observed, that this society [of lawyers] hath a peculiar cant
and jargon of their own, that no other mortal man can understand, and wherein
all their laws are written, which they take special care to multiply; whereby they
have wholly confounded the very essence of truth and falsehood ....
J. SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS, pt. 4, ch. 5 (1726).
** B.A. (summa cum laude), Southwestern College Winfield, Kansas; J.D. (with special
distinction), University of Oklahoma. Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College
of Law. The author currently practices with the firm of Holliman, Langholz, Runnels &
Dorwart a Professional Corporation, in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
1. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 1, 1 (1978).
2. Gee & Elkins, Resistance to Legal Ethics, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 29, 29 (1987).
3. The ABA Model Rules have spawned a profusion of articles. See, e.g., Aronson, An
Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The Rules of Professional Conduct Anno-
tated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823 (1986); Gaetke, Why Kentucky Should Adopt the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 74 KY. L.J. 581 (1985-86); Kulhman, Penn-
sylvania Considers The A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 419 (1986);
Stevens, Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct: A Comparative Analysis, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 463 (1988); Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
24 WASHBURN L.J. 443 (1985); Note, Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct: A Comparison
with the Old Code, 21 IND. L. REV. 307 (1988); Note, Oklahoma's Proposed Rules of Profes-
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the public assumes as a matter of course that most lawyers are unethical, if
not outright dishonest. 4  Lawyers do, however, take ethics seriously,
although their motives for doing so have been cynically examined.5 A pleth-
ora of legal literature abounds on almost every ethical facet of the legal prac-
tice,6 and extends even to articles about ethics issues surrounding lawyers'
sional Conduct.: Changes That May Affect You, 23 TULSA L.J. 283 (1987). A useful, but some-
what outdated annotated bibliography of legal ethics resources is VAN SCHAICK, LEGAL
ETHICS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE GUIDE (1984). In addition, local
bar associations enact supplemental codes, most often concerning trial courtesy and conduct.
See Briggs, El Paso County Bar Association Standards of Professional Courtesy, 18 COLO. LAW.
212 (1989).
4. For a less than flattering look at various perceptions of the trustworthiness of lawyers,
see Luke 11:52 (King James) ("Alas for you experts in the law! For you have taken the key to
the door of knowledge but you have not entered it yourselves, and you have kept out those
who tried to enter."); Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston
Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 67 (1974) (poll rating lawyers at bottom of twelve profes-
sional groups with respect to trust); Sloviter, Perceptions of the Legal Profession, 10 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 175, 175 (1988) (noting National Law Journal poll finding only 5% of those
queried rated legal profession most deserving of respect). In 1945, a Mississippi lawyer la-
mented, "a large number, probably a majority of the people of Mississippi believe, and take for
granted, that only a very few lawyers are honest." Stone, Our Low Estate, 17 Miss. L.J. 90, 91
(1945). In 1940, a survey by the California State Bar found that while a majority of those
questioned rated doctors and dentists highly on issues of ethics and honesty, only about 25%
(ethics) and 21% (honesty) of those questioned rated lawyers high in those categories. 0.
PHILLIPS & P. McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS ix (1952); see also Blaustein,
What Do Lawmen Think of Lawyers?, 38 A.B.A. J. 39 (1952) (polls showing need for better
public relations); Sallus, Professional Image: Can a Good Person Ever Become a Good Lawyer?,
11 L.A. Law 30 (1988); Thomforde, Public Opinion of the Legal Profession: A Necessary Re-
sponse By the Bar and the Law School, 41 TENN. L. REV. 503 (1974) (public opinion of lawyers
reflects society's feelings toward our entire legal system); Waltz, The Unpopularity of Lawyers
in America, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 143 (1976) (lighthearted discourse on mockery lawyers
subjected to); Comment, Public and Professional Assessment of the Nebraska Bar, 55 NEB. L.
REV. 57 (1975) (public confidence at all time low); Panel Discussion, The Public's Impression
of Lawyers' Ethics, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 439 (1954) (nine scholars and community notables
debate public's perception).
5. One legal journalist noted: "The Code of Professional Responsibility, as the Canons
of Professional Ethics before it, is a treasure trove of moral platitudes .... Virtually none of
this inspirational material, however, has anything to do with legal ethics as actually enforced
by the courts and bar associations." Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, 63 A.B.A. J. 202,
203 (1978); see also Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethics Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639
(1981) (rules for controlling market and legitimizing role of elite attorneys); Andrews, Non-
Lawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1989) (examining rules prohibiting nonattorney ownership or manage-
ment of law firms and concluding basis for rule is economic self-interest); Gillers, What We
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 243 (1985) (most binding requirements in Model Rules duplicative of existing elements of
agency, tort, and contract law); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 589 (1985) (ABA Model Rules not rules of ethics).
6. For an analysis of the ethical obligations of attorneys in a variety of situations and
specializations, see, e.g., Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.
355 (1986); Crouch, The Matter of Bombers: Unfair Tactics and the Problem of Defining Un-
ethical Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 FAM. L.Q. 413 (1986); Durst, The Tax Lawyer's
Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027 (1987); Freedman, The Professional Re-
sponsibility of the Law Professor. Three Neglected Questions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 275 (1986);
Garcia & Batey, The Roles of Counsel for the Parent in Child Dependency Proceedings, 22 GA.
L. REV. 1079 (1988); Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Pre-
serving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotation Context, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811 (1987);
Henry, Ethics in United States Patent Practice, 62 A.B.A. J. 465 (1976); Johnson, An Ethical
Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST.
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support staffs. 7 Yet, in this wealth of ethics literature, one area has been
neglected: civil appellate practice. Only a handful of articles devote them-
selves to this area,8 a realm with increasing caseloads and lengthening
dockets. 9
Given this dearth of scholarship, this Article examines a selected number
of ethics issues in the context of appellate practice. For purposes of this
work, the scope of legal ethics is broadly painted. As one New York court
defined the term, legal ethics means "the usages and customs among mem-
bers of the legal profession involving their moral and professional duties to-
ward one another, toward the clients and toward the courts . . .,,"
Research resources in this area are therefore not limited to disciplinary pro-
L.J. 57 (1984); Kershen, Ethical Issues for Corporate Counsel in Internal Investigations: A
Problem Analyzed, 13 OKLA. U.L. REV. 1 (1988); Koqut, Professional Responsibility and Rep-
resenting Older Persons with Diminished Competence, 67 MICH. B.J. 1118 (1988); Martin, Pro-
fessional Responsibility and Probate Practices, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 911; O'Brien, Multistate
Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 16 SETON HALL 678 (1986); Riger, The Model
Rules and Corporate Practice-New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729
(1985); Sanford, Ethical, Statutory and Regulatory Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transac-
tions, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 79 (1985); Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic,
41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); Snyder, Ethics and the Settlement of Civil Rights Cases.: Can
Attorneys Keep Their Virtue and Their Fees?, 16 N.M.L. REV. 283 (1986); Terry, Ethical Pit-
falls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1055 (1988);
Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 Ky.
L.J. 787 (1982-1983); Fishman, Book Review, 8 PACE L. REV. 303 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Buehring, Setting Standards for Legal Assistants, 53 FLA. B.J. 8 (1979);
Dunlop, Ethical Guidelines for Legal Support Staff, 66 MICH. B.J. 168 (1986); Lehan, Ethical
Considerations of Employing Paralegals in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 14 (1979); Stevenson, Using
Paralegals in the Practice of Law, 62 ILL. B.J. 432 (1974); Ulrich & Clarke, Working With
Legal Assistants: Professional Responsibility, 67 A.B.A. J. 992 (1981); Panel, An Ethical Code
for Law Librarianship?, 62 L. LIBR. J. 409 (1969); see also Buckley, Law Office Economics and
the Associates: Ethical Considerations, 24 GA. ST. B.J. 136 (1988) (discussing ethical consider-
ations of client billing); Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 259 (1985) (guidance for resolving certain ethical problems).
8. R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION §§ 3.6-.10 (1985); R. UNDERWOOD & W. FOR-
TUNE, TRIAL ETHICS §§ 19.1-.4 (1988); Aidisert, The Appellate Bar.: Professional Responsibil-
ity and Professional Competence-A View from the Jaundiced Eye of One Appellate Judge, I 1
CAP. U.L. REV. 445 (1982); Seidenfeld, Professional Responsibility Before Reviewing Courts, 25
DE PAUL L. REV. 264 (1976); Tiedemann, The Outer Limits of Florida Appellate Advocacy, 60
FLA. B.J. 11 (1986); Uviller, Zeal and Frivolity: The Ethical Duty of the Appellate Advocate to
Tell the Truth About Law, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729 (1978); see also Alexander, The Appellate
Court and The Lawyer, 20 MIss. L.J. 435 (1949) (discussing interaction between judges and
lawyers); Clark, The Lawyer's Duties to the Court, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 404 (1954) (describing
legal ethics in the courtroom); Harwood, What I Expect from an Appellate Lawyer, 25 ALA.
LAW. 356 (1964) (judge's ethical guidelines for appellate lawyers).
9. See Carpenter, Appellate Delay as Catalyst for Change in Virginia, 23 U. RICH. L.
REV. 141 (1988); Marvell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 17 AKRON L. REV. 43
(1982); Marvell, Is There an Appeal from the Caseload Deluge?, 24 JUDGES J. 34 (1985); Mc-
Cormick, Appellate Congestion in Iowa: Dimensions and Remedies, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 133
(1975); Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
206 (1984); Peters, The Problems of Caseload and Delay in the Minnesota Supreme Court-An
Introduction to a Symposium, 7 WM. MITCHEL L L. REV. 41 (1981); Talmadge, Toward a
Reduction of Washington Appellate Court Caseloads and More Effective Use of Appellate Court
Resources, 21 GONZ. L. REv. 21 (1985); Project, The Pennsylvania Project-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court: Perspectives from Within, 23 VII.L. L. REV. 1041 (1977-1978).
10. Kraushaar v. LaVin, 181 Misc. 508, 42 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term, Queens
Cty. 1943) (citing BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (1st ed. 1930)) (oral statements ac-
cusing certain lawyer of unethical behavior slanderous per se).
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ceedings, but also include court-imposed sanctions outside the disciplinary
process, legal malpractice cases considering ethical norms, cases discussing
sanctions for violation of procedural rules, and nonsanction instances where
courts express concern over the ethics of an attorney's particular conduct."
Although the issues discussed in this Article are not unique to appellate
practice, they often arise in that context. This Article first analyzes various
ethical factors involved in the initiation of an appeal. The Article then fo-
cuses on positional conflicts, which raise ethical questions for the appellate
attorney advocating competing legal positions. Finally, the Article considers
specialized elements of the general requirement that the appellate attorney
exercise the highest degree of candor with the court. Throughout this analy-
sis, the overarching theme of the Article is the attorney's obligation of integ-
rity to his client and to the court.
I. INITIATION OF THE APPEAL
The fundamental question an appellate lawyer must consider is whether to
initiate the appeal process, either as losing trial counsel or as new counsel
brought on board for the appeal. In this day of legal specialization, 12 an
attorney inexperienced with the appellate process might be considered negli-
gent or unethical in not referring a case to an attorney who handles appellate
work.13 Failure to follow appellate rules and norms can lead to severe penal-
11. See, e.g., 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 9.4-.6 (3d ed. 1989)
(addressing inherent power, FED. R. CIV. P. 11, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 respectively); Note,
Liability for Proceeding With Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND L. REV, 743 (1980) (hereinafter
Note, Liability]; Note, When is an Attorney Unreasonable and Vexatious?, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 249 (1988) (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
12. See, e.g., I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 11, § 15.4; C. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 5.5 (2d ed. 1986); Kaskoff, Specialization, Ethics and Advertising, 7 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 47 (1986); Rollins, The Coming of Legal Specialization, 19 U. RICH. L.
REV. 479 (1985); Comment, Specialization: Resulting Standard of Care and Duty to Consult,
30 BAYLOR L. REV. 729 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Specialization]. But cf I R. MALLEN
& J. SMITH, supra note 11, § 24.39; R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 19.4
(although appellate work becoming more of specialty, no reported cases holding appellate law-
yers to higher standard of care); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal Ops. 234, 496
(1970), digested in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 17 (1970
Supp.) [hereinafter 0. MARU (1970 Supp.)] (arguing before United States Supreme Court not
specialized legal service within canon 4).
13. Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (Ct. App. 1979)
(duty to refer complex trust issues to specialist); In re Hardage, 713 S.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Mo.
1986) (attorney reprimanded, in part, for accepting a bankruptcy case while not admitted to
practice in relevant federal district court); cf In re Dempsey, 632 F. Supp. 908, 920 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) (attorney inexperienced and ignorant of federal criminal procedures had duty to
associate with knowledgeable counsel or to obtain advice of competent counsel); Russo v. Grif-
fin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436, 439 (1986) (court points out the need for attorney to advise
clients on referrals to specialists in particular cases); I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 11,
§ 15.4, at 871 (attorney's duty to inform client his knowledge and experience in a particular
field is limited). But cf McManus, Malpractice Dangers in Tort Case Referrals, 24 TRIAL 62,
63 (1988); Owens, New Counsel on Appeal?, 15 LITIG. 1 (1989) (analyzes different skills and
tactics essential in successful trial and appellate litigation and concludes appellate specialist
often necessary); Uviller, supra note 8, at 730 (noting differences between criminal trial and
appellate practice). The Code, in prohibiting fee-splitting under DR 2-107(A), served to dis-
courage referral to an appellate specialist. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.5(e) (1983) permits fee-splitting if done with full disclosure to, and consent from, the client.
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ties. Courts have sanctioned attorneys for filing rambling briefs 14 and for
failing to comply with appropriate appellate rules.' 5
Assuming the attorney decides to accept the case, the next issue is
whether to take the appeal. Although the many factors to consider in initiat-
ing an appeal are covered in depth elsewhere, 16 the following briefly summa-
rizes the factors most pertinent to this Article's focus.
(a) Is the appeal frivolous? The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) provide a good faith objective test 17 for determining whether
R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 1.6. Failure to follow the applicable appel-
late rules and customs can lead to sanctions. See Comment, Specialization, supra note 12, at
729; Comment, General Practitioners Beware: The Duty to Refer an Estate Planning Client to a
Specialist, 14 CUMB. L. REV. 103 (1984); Note, Legal Malpractice, Expansion of the Standard
of Care. Duty to Refer, 56 WASH. L. REV. 505 (1981); see also R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 3.1
(discussing the growth of appellate practice as a speciality); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.3 (1st. ed 1981) (addressing whether new counsel should be
brought in on an appeal).
Of course, an attorney specializing in appellate practice might be held to the higher standard
of a specialist. Weitzel v. Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers, 667 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982)
(NLRB Specialist); Procanik v. Cillo, 206 N.J. Super. 270, 502 A.2d 94, 103 (Super Ct. Law
Div. 1985) (medical malpractice specialist); Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279,
1283 (1979) (trial specialist); cf. Huettig & Schronn, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council,
582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (sanctioning labor law specialists under rule 11, court
noted lawyers not merely engaged in general practice, but held themselves out as specialists),
aff'd, 790 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malprac-
tice Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond
Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. CINN. L. REV. 541 (1976) (discussing increase in legal malprac-
tice); I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 11, § 15.4 (specialization).
14. See Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1985) (counsel sanctioned
for filing rambling briefs and failing to address the issues); Morse v. Nelson, 48 I11. App. 2d
895, 363 N.E.2d 167 (1977) (duty of appellate counsel to provide lucid and persuasive argu-
ment rather than obtuse, confusing argument); Dortch v. Lugar, 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25
(1971) (duty of appellate counsel to argue issues suitably).
15. See, e.g., In re Tranakos, 639 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1981) (attorney suspended until he
demonstrates knowledge of appellate rules); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 504 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (attorney publicly reprimanded for failure to follow appellate rules); Mitchell
v. State, 433 So. 2d 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (attorney publicly reprimanded for failing to
file appellate briefs and failing to respond to court's show cause order); Hong v. Kong, 67
Haw. 15, 675 P.2d 769 (1984) (attorney sanctioned for filing brief in violation of court rules).
16. See M. HouTs & W. ROGOSHESKE, ART OF ADVOCACY-APPEAL §§ 1.01-.10 (1981);
R. LYNN, supra note 8, §§ 6.1-.6; R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE §§ 2.1-.6
(1983); R. STERN, supra note 13, § 2.2.
17. Compare with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2)
(1980) (subjective test requiring lawyer not knowingly to advance a claim unwarranted under
existing law, unless good faith argument can be made for extension, modification, or overruling
of existing law); see I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 329-35 (1985); MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (1983).
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an appeal is frivolous. 18  The literature is voluminous on this issue. 19
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
No "duty of candor" exists, however, compelling the attorney to label his argument so as to
show the court that the argument (1) is supported by existing law, or (2) is contrary to existing
law but is supported by a good faith argument for reversal or modification. Mary Ann Pen-
siero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1988); Golden Eagle Distrib. Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986), revg on this point 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1984). Contra Davis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 696 F. Supp. 634, 636 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
(attorney should clearly delineate good faith arguments for extension, modification, or
reversal).
19. For a sampling of the literature, see R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8,
§ 19.2; Kallay, The Dismissal of Frivolous Appeals by the California Courts of Appeal, 54 CAL.
ST. B.J. 92 (1979); Martineau, Frivolous Appeals.- The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 845 (1984); Saunders, Plying the Erie Waters.- Choice of Law in the Deterrence of Frivolous
Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653 (1987); Underwood, Taking and Pursuing a Case.- Some Observa-
tions Regarding "Legal Ethics" and Attorney Accountability, 74 Ky. L.J. 173 (1985-1986);
Note, Liability, supra note 11, at 743; Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation,
26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980).
In branding one appeal frivolous, a Missouri court observed:
We find nothing which points to a good faith belief in the merits of this ap-
peal. The total lack of evidentiary support, the misstatements of the evidence,
the apparent failure to research the law and supply authority for the point on
appeal, the reference to the incorrect standard of review, and the minimal effort
to present a fairly debatable issue convince us that this appeal is frivolous and an
attempt to delay the dissolution proceedings or harass the wife.
Jensen v. Jensen, 670 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Two examples of frivolous appeals are as follows: (1) the appeal merely invites the appellate
court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence; and (2) the law is well settled and
no showing is made that it was misapplied. Booth v. Weiser Irrigation Dist., 112 Idaho 684,
735 P.2d 995, 998 (1987); accord Ross v. Ross, 200 Cal. App. 2d 229, 19 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1962)
(appeal frivolous when only argument was weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses). In
In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court, finding counsel worthy of discipli-
nary action, stated:
[His] conduct in filing and maintaining frivolous appeals having no colorable
basis in law or fact has wasted the time and limited resources of this court, has
denied availability of the court's resources to deserving litigants, and has consti-
tuted flagrant and totally inexcusable abuse of the judicial process.
Id. at 1575; see also In re Cook, 526 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 1986) (attorney disbarred in part for
bringing appeal in bad faith merely to harass or injure opposing party). Indeed, one useful
measuring stick in determining frivolity may well be the amount of care the appellate court has
to expend to determine the issue. Shreveport v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 131 La.
933, 60 So. 621, 622 (1913). The most often-used sanction against frivolous appeals is not
disciplinary action, but imposition of monetary sanctions against either (or both) attorney and
client under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, FED. R. App. P. 38, and their state counterparts. Coghlan v.
Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1988) (analyzing precedents and policy behind FED. R.
App. P. 38; sanctions merited where result of appeal obvious from a comprehensive and deci-
sive exposition of the law by the court below); see Note, Liability, supra note 11, at 743; Anno-
tation, What Conduct Constitutes Multiplying Proceedings Unreasonably and Vexatiously so as
to Warrant Imposition of Liability on Counsel Under 28 US. C § 1927for Excess Costs, Ex-
penses, and Attorney's Fees, 81 A.L.R. FED. 36 (1987); Annotation, Attorneys'Fees," Obduracy
as a Basis for State Court Award, 49 A.L.R.4TH §§ 13, 14, at 825 (1986); Annotation, Award of
Damages or Costs Under 28 USC. § 1912 or Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
Against Appellant Who Brings Frivolous Appeal, 67 A.L.R. FED. 319 (1984); Annotation,
Award of Damages For Dilatory Tactics in Prosecuting Appeal in State Court, 91 A.L.R.3D 661
(1979); Annotation, Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Authorizing Imposition
of Liability for Excess Costs on Counsel Who Multiplies the Proceedings Unreasonably and
Vexatiously, 12 A.L.R. FED. 910 (1972). Several states provide the appellate court with au-
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Clearly, a fine distinction inheres in this question, for not every losing appeal
is frivolous, 20 and a healthy margin of safety for those wishing to challenge
existing law is desirable. 21 Courts are aware of this fine line. 22 If an attor-
ney does determine that an appeal is frivolous, the attorney has the responsi-
bility so to inform the client. 23 In fact, the attorney who does not advise the
client of the fruitlessness of the appeal may be held liable for malpractice. 24
thority to impose a penalty of 10% of the amount in dispute upon a finding that the appeal was
frivolous. See, e.g., Burleson v. Jordan, 163 Ga. App. 496, 295 S.E.2d 335 (1982); Property
Management Servs., Inc. v. PMC Village Inn, Ltd., 91 Or. App. 225, 754 P.2d 611 (1988);
Beckham v. City Wide Air Conditioning Co., 695 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no
writ). These discretionary statutes are to be compared to the mandatory penalty provisions
described infra note 20.
20. One court noted, "the line between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no
merit is fine." Price v. Price, 134 Ariz. 112, 654 P.2d 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing In re
Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 188 (1982)); accord Meeks v. Jewel Cos.,
845 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1988); Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1983); In
re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179 (1982); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson,
674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984); Polyloom Corp. v. Varsity Carpet Servs., Inc., 175 Ga. App. 806,
334 S.E.2d 386 (1985); George A. Hormel, Inc. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d 927 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Nissen v. Fargo, 338 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1983); cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989)
(in forma pauperis complaint not automatically frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because it
fails to state a claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Opposing counsel should therefore be
cautious in requesting sanctions for frivolous appeals. There are sanctions for filing what the
court deems to be a frivolous motion for sanctions. Parrington v. Jedan, 870 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1989); Meeks v. Jewel Cos., 845 F.2d at 1421; Nakash v. United States, 708 F. Supp. 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 101 F.R.D. 161, 200
(1984). Note, however, that some states impose a mandatory penalty of a specified percent for
unsuccessful appeals. See Collins v. North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 445 So. 2d 828 (Miss.
1984) (discussing Mississippi's 15% penalty when appeal unsuccessful regardless of merits of
case); Note, Mandatory 10 Percent Penalty on Unsuccessful Appeals of Money Judgments in
Alabama-Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 32 ALA. L. REV. 197 (1980). The
Supreme Court recently found such a statute constitutional in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 701 (1988), but inapplicable to federal diversity actions, Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
21. As well put by the Indiana Supreme Court in Orr v. Turco Mfg. Co., 512 N.E.2d 151
(Ind. 1987):
The vitality of the law as a living institution rests largely upon its capacity to
embrace and promote the opposing concepts of stability and growth. We are
mindful of Dean Pound's aphorism: "Law must be stable and yet it cannot
stand still." To facilitate these objectives, we must invite, not inhibit, the pres-
entation of new and creative argument. We therefore hold that punitive sanc-
tions may not be imposed to punish lack of merit unless an appellant's
contentions and argument are utterly devoid of plausibility.
Id. at 153 (quoting POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923)).
22. One court implored attorneys to be careful "not to 'stifle the enthusiasm or chill the
creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law.' " Mone v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 570, 574
(2d Cir. 1985) (citing Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985)).
23. Seidenfeld, supra note 8, at 268-69; see also R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 3.7 (discussing
attorney's duty to advise and communicate to client all aspects of appeals). The duty to advise
is a continuing one, as a case not frivolous at its inception can become frivolous when ap-
pealed. Seyler v. Seyler, 678 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1982). Indeed, an appeal not frivolous when
originally filed may later become frivolous as a result of intervening case law or other reasons.
Holloway v. Walker, 811 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1987); cf Westcot Corp. v. Edo Corp., 857 F.2d
1387 (10th Cir. 1988) (attorney sanctioned $250 for filing meritless petition for rehearing).
24. See D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 15.4
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983); R. LYNN, supra note 8,
§ 3.7; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980); cf In re Paauwe, 294
Or. 171, 654 P.2d 1117 (1982) (attorney who undertook appeal without consulting clients
disciplined when appeal found meritless and prejudicial to administration of justice; clients
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Should the client insist on appealing, the attorney must decline to represent
the client. 25 Ultimately, courts hold the attorney fully responsible for failing
to disclose such information to the client.2 6 In order to avoid malpractice
exposure the attorney should advise the client of possible deadlines and the
client's option to seek another attorney's opinion. 27
(b) What is the objective of the appeal? Is the objective to press a merito-
rious issue, or is it to harass the winning party or to delay the process of
justice? If the purpose is either to harass the opposing party or to appeal to
secure a delay in execution of the judgment, the appeal may be unethical. 28
Courts may impose sanctions even if the legal and factual basis for the litiga-
tion is not totally frivolous. 29 Model Rule 3.2 provides that "a lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of
nonetheless responsible for additional court costs resulting from appeal); Smith v. Saint Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973) (if attorney believes adverse conse-
quences possible from taking course of action he advises, he has duty so to inform client),
aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974).
25. See McConnell v.Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1981); Cosenza v. Kramer, 152
Cal. App. 3d 1100, 200 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1984); Tupling v. Britton, 411 A.2d 349 (D.C. 1980);
Evans v. Commonwealth, 64 Pa. Commw. 34, 447 A.2d 1119 (1982); Mo. B.A., Informal Op.
78-26 (1978), digested in 0. MARU (1970 Supp.), supra note 12, 11,355; PHILADELPHIA
B.A., Op. (1978) (unnumbered opinion rendered on Oct. 24), digested in 0. MARU (1970
Supp.), supra note 12, 12,700; see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 (1981)
(dictum stating public defender has no obligation to file frivolous appeal); R. LYNN, supra note
8, § 6.9 (ethical duty to refuse litigation of frivolous appeal); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) (duty to refuse frivolous appeal); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980) (duty not to take action serving only to
harass). Conversely, it is unethical for an attorney to initiate an appeal without the client's
authorization. Soliman v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 822 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1987); cf Burke v. Burke,
169 Mich. App. 348, 425 N.W.2d 550 (1988) (disregarding client's instructions, attorney filed
motion to amend judgment; court awarded sanctions of $900 to opposing counsel against
attorney).
26. McCandless v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1983).
27. R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 6.9; cf In re Henke, 121 Wis. 2d 689, 359 N.W.2d 924
(1985) (attorney suspended both for failing to notify client that attorney had concluded appeal
would be without merit and for refusing to return retainer to client); cf Harris v. Maready, 84
N.C. App. 607, 353 S.E.2d 656 (attorney not liable since, after declining employment on basis
that suit fruitless, attorney helped plaintiff locate new counsel and promptly turned pertinent
files over to new counsel), review denied, 320 N.C. 168, 358 S.E.2d 50 (1987).
28. See, e.g., In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985) (suit brought with plausible
basis, but pursued only to impose cost on other side, constitutes abuse of process subject to 28
U.S.C. § 1927); Hibbert v. I.N.S., 554 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1977) (avoid deportation); Overmeyer
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 543 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (avoid paying judgment);
People v. Kane, 655 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1982) (avoid support order); OKLA. B.A., Op. 23 (1922)
(improper to assert invalid defense for sole purpose of delay in hope that note can be paid off
before judgment); see I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 336.1-38 (rule 3.2); C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 11.2.5. But see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal
Op. 689 (1963), 1 INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 271 (1975) (under Canons of Ethics, no viola-
tion to take appeal in case to gain time for settlement unless appeal wholly without merit).
29. Hersch v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 194 Cal. Rptr. 628
(1983) (appellate court, disclaiming any need to determine frivolousness of appeal, imposed
$125,000 sanction for filing and pursuing appeal solely for purpose of delay); cf Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1988) (motion to dismiss brought
for improper purpose can be sanctioned under rule II even if not frivolous); San Bernadino
Community Hosp. v. Office of State Wide Health Planning & Dev., 187 Cal. App. 3d 459, 231
Cal. Rptr. 673 (1986) (dictum).
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the client."' 30 The comment to rule 3.2 further refines the client's interest to
exclude "[r]ealizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay
in litigation" as a legitimate client interest.3 ' One such impermissible pur-
pose would be to reap the benefits of the disparity between the market rate
for the use of money and the statutory judgment rate. 3 2
(c) Is the attorney prepared to prosecute the appeal through to its conclu-
sion? Once the attorney has agreed to undertake the appeal, the attorney is
bound to exercise professional zeal in conducting the appeal, including the
appeal's perfection, the appellate briefs, oral argument, and any other proce-
dural or substantive requirement of the applicable court rule or statute.
Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to act with promptness and reasonable diligence
in representing the client.3 3 Failure to represent the client adequately on
appeal can result in severe disciplinary sanction. 34 Competent representa-
tion, of course, includes an obligation to follow all applicable court rules. 35
(d) What are new counsel's responsibilities? If the appeal is referred by the
trial attorney, or more importantly, is handed to the attorney by a new cli-
ent, special considerations enter into the picture. The appellate attorney
needs to assure the cooperation of trial counsel to help understand the rec-
ord and to answer questions throughout the appellate process. 36 The new
appellate counsel need not decline representation until trial counsel has been
30. The Code contains a similar directive, DR 7-102(A)(1) preventing conduct serving
merely to harass or maliciously injure another. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 comment (1983); see I G.
HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, rule 1.3.
32. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 11.2.5; cf Bankers' Trust Co. v. Publicker Indus.,
Inc., 641 F.2d 1361 (2d Cir. 1981) (dictum).
33. See In re Grubbs' Appeal, 403 P.2d 260 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965) (once attorney
agrees to undertake appeal, attorney is obligated to prosecute appeal diligently, using all ethi-
cal means). See also MODEL OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3)
(lawyer not to neglect matter entrusted to him), DR 7-10l(A)(1) (lawyer not to fail intention-
ally to seek lawful objectives of client through reasonably available means permitted by law),
DR 7-102(A)(2) (lawyer not to fail to carry out contract of employment), DR 7-102(A)(3)
(lawyer not to damage or prejudice client during course of relationship) (1980).
34. Case overload has been rejected as a mitigating factor. See In re Kennedy, 97 Wash.
2d 719, 649 P.2d 110 (1982); In re Fraser, 83 Wash. 2d 884, 523 P.2d 921 (1974). For result of
disciplinary action for failure to pursue properly the appellate process, see In re Palmer, 110
Ariz. 414, 519 P.2d 1155 (1974); Florida Bar v. King, 242 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1971); Florida Bar
v. Dingle, 220 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1969); In re Jones, 455 N.E.2d 903 (Ind. 1983); In re Garrett, 399
N.E.2d 369 (Ind. 1980); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Jackson, 391 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa
1986); State v. Thompson, 208 N.W.2d 926 (Iowa 1973); State v. Regier, 228 Kan. 746, 621
P.2d 431 (1980); State v. Shumacher, 210 Kan. 377, 502 P.2d 748 (1972); In re Daggs, 411
Mich. 304, 307 N.W.2d 66 (1981); In re Montrey, 511 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1974); In re Geraghty,
128 A.D.2d 913, 512 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1987); In re Taylor, 81 A.D.2d 59, 439 N.Y.S.2d 206
(1981); In re McKinnon, 200 N.W.2d 62 (N.D. 1972); In re Loew, 292 Or. 806, 642 P.2d 1171
(1982).
35. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 137 Ariz. 213, 669 P.2d 990 (1983) (failure to follow court
rule requiring appropriate references in the record for statements of fact); Frances v. State, 261
Ind. 461, 305 N.E.2d 883 (1974) (failure to follow rule requiring citation of authority or cogent
argument); Dortch v. Lugar, 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25, 51 (1971) (adherence to applicable
rules not left to option of appellate attorney).
36. R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 6.2; Lyons, Appellate Practice Pointers for Alabama Lawyers
in Civil Cases, 44 ALA. LAw. 6, 8 (1983). Counsel who is replacing the trial attorney should
inquire regarding the reason for replacement; see Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer, 7 U. FLA. L.
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paid but should notify trial counsel of the new representation in the case. 37
A sensitive yet unresolved ethical area concerns appellate counsel's obliga-
tion to inform the client of trial counsel's malpractice. In Informal Opinion
146538 the American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility (Committee) ruled, on a very narrow set of facts, that
the appellate attorney had no ethical obligation to report the malpractice to
the client. In this opinion appellate counsel to a prisoner asked the ABA
whether he had an obligation to inform the client that the client might have
a civil cause of action against the trial counsel for malpractice. The issue
posed is an important one, as appellate criminal defendants often raise the
issue of ineffective trial counsel.3 9 Based upon the limited representation
undertaken by appellate criminal counsel, the Committee reasoned that ap-
pellate counsel did not have such an obligation. 40 The client had not sought
the advice and the appellate counsel's scope of representation did not include
civil claims for damages. 4
1
The Committee felt that the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code neither
prohibited nor required the advice. 42 Citing Ethical Consideration 2.2 urg-
ing lawyers to assist lay persons to recognize legal problems that may not be
self-revealing, however, the Committee, however, did conclude that it would
REV. 375, 381 (1954). For a good general discussion of the problems engendered by the last
minute referral, see Underwood, supra note 19, at 182-86.
37. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 10 (1926), reprinted in AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 246 (1967); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1142 (1970), reprinted in II INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS
357 (1975); CLEVELAND B.A., Op. 56 (1967), digested in 0. MARU (1970 Supp.), supra note
12, 7145; COLO. B.A., Op. 40 (1968), digested in 0. MARU (1970 Supp.), supra note 12,
6214; L.A. COUNTY B.A., Op. 183 (1951), digested in 0. MARU & R. CLOUGH, DIGEST OF
BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 426 (1970); MICH. B.A., Op. 204 (1968), digested in 0.
MARU (1970 Supp.), supra note 12, 6775; SAN DIEGO COUNTY B.A., Op. 1972-17 (1972),
digested in 0. MARU (1970 Supp.), supra note 12, 7938; WIs. B.A., Memo Op. 8770 (1977),
reprinted in 57 WIS. B. BULL. 101-02 (1984). Contra IND. B.A., Op. 2-1966 (1967), digested in
0. MARL, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 8429 (1975 Supp.) [hereinafter
0. MARU (1975 Supp.)].
38. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 385 (1985). The ABA Committee issues
both formal and informal opinions. The ABA Committee issues formal opinions on subjects of
widespread interest. Those opinions are published in full in the A.B.A. Journal. Informal
opinions are only summarized in the A.B.A. Journal pursuant to American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Committee), Rule of Proce-
dure 3. Neither form of opinion is binding on attorneys unless made so by the appropriate
state governing body. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1420 (1978), reprinted in FORMAl AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 312 (1985). The
work of the Committee is critically analyzed in Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Associa-
tion Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981). See also C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 2.6.6 (ethics opinions "rarely cited and relied upon in judicial
decisions").
39. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST 3D (vol. 27, Crim. Law, headnote
641.13-641.13(8)) has over 170 pages of decisions involving claims of ineffective representa-
tion, with over 100 pages in its 1988 pocket part.
40. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1465 (1978),
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be proper for the lawyer not only to inform the client of the possible cause of
action but also fully to discuss the cause's practical limitations.43 It is uncer-
tain whether the Committee's reasoning would exonerate a civil appellate
counsel from notifying the client of possible trial malpractice. The better
view would require such notification. 4 4 Not requiring the appellate counsel
to notify the client of the malpractice, but requiring counsel to notify the
appropriate court or disciplinary body of the trial lawyer's breach of profes-
sional ethics would be incongruous.45 Although a breach of professional
43. id.
44. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(a)(3) (1980) in-
structs the attorney not to prejudice the client during the course of the professional relation-
ship. Not disclosing the prior attorney's malpractice could certainly prejudice the client. Id.
The Model Rules, however, have no exact counterpart; the closest provision is rule 1.3, requir-
ing diligence on the part of the attorney. Id. see Tallon v. Committee on Professional Stan-
dards, 86 A.D.2d 897, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1982) (duty to inform client of possible malpractice
claims against him); COLO. B.A., Informal Op. 4-27-74 (1974), digested in 0. MARU, supra
note 37, 8020 (duty to report partner's negligence to client); IIl B.A. Comm. on Professional
Responsibility, Op. 88-11 (1989), extracted in ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT [CURRENT REPORTS] 156 (1989) (duty of lawyer to whom case is referred
to disclose potential malpractice committed by referring counsel under MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(a)(3) (1980)); L.A. COUNTY B.A., Op. 313 (1969), di-
gested in 0. MARU (1975 Supp.), supra note 37, 7668 (duty to inform client without
recommendation to sue); MICH. B.A., Informal Op. 363 (1979), digested in 0. MARU, DIGEST
OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 11719 (1980 Supp.) [hereinafter 0.
MARU (1980 Supp.)] (duty to report to client malpractice of co-counsel); Wis. B.A. Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Formal Op. E-82-12 (1982), reprinted in 57 WIs. B. BULL. 78 (1984) (duty
to inform client of own malpractice); cf Swann, The Ethical Obligation to Disclose Attorney
Negligence, 13 COLO. LAW. 232 (1984) (discussing duty to disclose own negligence to client).
45. The incongruity would approach the ridiculous in the common situation where the
breach was discovered by the appellate attorney under circumstances that made discovery a
privileged communication. The attorney would then need the client's permission to inform the
disciplinary body. The Model Rules require that the violation "raises a substantial question as
to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." See MODEL
RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983). The Model Code contains no such limi-
tation. See I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 11, § 1.9; Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the
Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 64 n.132 (1989); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1210 (1972), reprinted in II INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS
445 (1975) (duty to report violations of associate); ARIz. B.A., Op. 213 (1966), digested in 0.
MARU (1970 Supp.), supra note 12, 5967 (duty to report unethical conduct); ILL. B.A., Op.
429 (1974), digested in 0. MARU (1975 Supp.), supra note 37, 8339 (duty to report incompe-
tence if knowledge not obtained through privilege); L.A. COUNTY B.A., Op. 355 (1976), di-
gested in 0. MARU (1980 Supp.), supra note 44, 10,548 (duty to report incompetence if
knowledge unprivileged); Mo. B.A., Informal Op. 2 (1978), digested in 0. MARU (1980 Supp.),
supra note 44, 11860 (if knowledge privileged, can only reveal professional violation with
client's consent); TEX. B.A., Informal Op. 78-9 (1979), digested in 0. MARU (1980 Supp.),
supra note 44, 12,760 (duty to report incompetence if knowledge unprivileged); VA. B.A.,
Informal Op. 366, digested in 0. MARU (1980 Supp.), supra note 44, 12,989 (duty to report
violations if information not privileged); VA. B.A., Informal Ops. 349, 350, 366, digested in 0.
MARU (1980 Supp.), supra note 44, 12,977, 12,978, 12,989 (duty to report incompetence
if knowledge unprivileged); VA. B.A., Informal Op. 113, digested in 0. MARU (1975 Supp.),
supra note 37, 10044 (improper to report violation if knowledge obtained from client in
confidence and client refuses to consent to disclosure). But see SAN FRANCISCO B.A., Op.
1977-1 (1977), digested in 0. MARU (1980 Supp.), supra note 44, 10,694 (California rules
impose no reporting duty). The duty of disclosure may be tempered, however, by the injunc-
tion against bringing a frivolous action under MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.1 (1983). See In re Belue, 766 P.2d 206 (Mont. 1988) (attorney disciplined for filing
frivolous and unfounded ethical violation against opposing counsel). The ethical obligations of
confidentiality are greater and more encompassing than those imposed by the attorney-client
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ethics is not per se malpractice, 46 the two areas do overlap to a considerable
privilege. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980); NCK Org.
Ltd. v. Gergman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.
1974) (statutory privilege protects only confidences, while ethical obligations include any other
information client requests to be inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
detrimental to the client); Skokie Gold Standard Liquors v. Joseph, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 452
N.E.2d 804 (1983); Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, 102 Wash. 2d 527, 688 P.2d 506 (1984)
(while statutory privilege covers only confidences, ethical rule covers both confidences and
secrets). The Model Rules abolished the Code's distinction between confidences and secrets
and simply enjoin disclosure of any "information relating to representation of a client."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
The contours of the attorney's duty to report unethical conduct has been exhaustively ex-
amined. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.10.1; Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforce-
ment of Ethics-Fear and Learning in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1982);
Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491; Marcotte, The Duty To Inform, 75
A.B.A. J. (1989) (discussing In re Hinnel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988) (case involv-
ing settlement agreement that prohibited disclosure of former attorney's conversion of client
funds to disciplinary authorities; client's present attorney who settled action against former
attorney suspended for one year)); Swann, supra note 44, at 232; Thode, The Duty of Lawyers
and Judges to Report Other Lawyer's Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976
UTAH L. REV. 95; Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIz. L.
REV. 509 (1978).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983). The scope of the
Model Rules is limited:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action .... They are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability .... Accordingly, nothing in the Rules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-
disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.
Id. at 12. The Model Code's preliminary statement contains a similar, but less emphatic dis-
claimer: "The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties
for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liability
of lawyers for professional conduct." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
preamble (1980); Terry Cove N., Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, Inc., 521 So. 2d 22 (Ala. 1988);
Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973); Bob Godfrey
Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981). Most of the reported cases, however,
involve a third party's (not the client's) attempt to impose liability on the attorney; see gener-
ally I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 11, ch. 7 (liability to nonclient for negligence).
Indeed, most of the cases involve attempts to avoid the limitations imposed on the remedy of
malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1982); Brody v.
Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. App. 2d 510, 597 P.2d 682
(1979); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d
763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The strict limitation of standing
to the client alone is, however, eroding. See Fiebach, A Chilling of the Adversary System: An
Attorney's Exposure to Liability from Opposing Parties or Counsel, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1301
(1988).
The literature on this subject, of particular financial concern to the profession, is under-
standably enormous. See Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage
Actions Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1 (1982) (distinguishing between client and
third-party actions); Faure & Strong, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: No Standard
for Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363 (1986); Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE
L. REV. 88 (1976-1977); Gillers, Ethics that Bite. Lawyer's Liability to Third Parties, 13 LITI-
GATION 8 (1987); Hoover, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Lawyer Malpractice
Actions: The Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 595
(1988); Mallen & Evans, Attorneys' Liability for Errors of Judgment-At the Crossroads, 48
TENN. L. REV. 283 (1981); Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979); see also Note, The Code of
Professional Responsibility in Attorney Malpractice: Illinois Attorneys Have a Duty to Inform
Clients of an Intent to Settle-Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 30 DE
PAUl L. REV. 499 (1981) (duty to inform clients of intent to settle); Note, Lipton v. Boesky:
The Code of Professional Liability as an Independent Basis for Legal Malpractice Liability,
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extent,47 especially under the requirement of competence of Model Rule
1.1.48
In states that have adopted the Model Rules, a procedure avoids this
problem. The Model Rules permit the appellate practitioner to limit the
objectives of the representation so as to exclude the duty to disclose trial
counsel's malpractice. The client, of course, must consent to the limita-
tion. 49 The prudent attorney would document the consent in writing, specif-
ically setting forth the limitations on the scope of representation. 50
II. POSITIONAL CONFLICTS
The literature is extensive on the relationship between ethical rules and
1984 DET. C.L. REV. 135 (Model Code as basis for malpractice); Note, Standard of Care in
Malpractice Actions Against Insurance Defense Counsel Inapplicability of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317 (1983) (Model Code inapplicable to insur-
ance defense counsel).
47. Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 544-45; 1 R. MALLEN & J.
SMITH, supra note 11, §§ 1.8, 1.9; see, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (Model Rules provide some evidence of standards required of
lawyers); Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. Fla. 1985) (where
client sues attorney for breach of fiduciary duty, Model Code "constitutes some evidence" of
standards); Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 487 N.E.2d 1376 (1985) (where disciplinary
rule's purpose is to protect plaintiff, violation of such rule may be some evidence of negli-
gence); Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 503 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)
(ABA standards adopted in New Jersey set minimum standards of competence and are there-
fore evidence in malpractice case); Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law
Firm Breakups, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1055, 1112-16 (1988) (collecting cases in which ethical
rules were used in legal malpractice actions); cf 10TH CIR. R. 46.5.3 (disciplinary action may
be taken against counsel who inadequately represent clients during appellate process).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983) provides: "A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(a)(1) (1980) directs the lawyer
not to "h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to
handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it." In id. DR 6-
101(a)(2) an attorney is further instructed to prepare adequately in the circumstances. See also
R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 3.6 (discussing appellate lawyer's duty to be competent); Spaeth, To
What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence of Lawyers?, 61 TEMPLE L. REV.
1211 (1988) (disciplinary Code helps but does not ensure attorney competence).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1983) provides: "A lawyer
may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation." The
Model Code contains no similar provision.
50. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 24-30; R. UNDERWOOD & W. FOR-
TUNE, supra note 8, § 1.12; cf Reich, Beyond Yes and No, 75 A.B.A. J. 110 (1989) (discussing
ethical issues implicated when client of attorney A seeks second opinion from another attorney
as to attorney A's representation of that client).
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conflicts of interest. 51 Both the Model Code 52 and the Model Rules 53 devote
much attention to conflicts of interest. The conflicts addressed, however,
consist primarily of (1) lawyer self-interest vis-i-vis a client's interest, (2)
lawyer as witness, (3) conflict between current clients, and (4) conflict be-
tween a current client's interest and a former client's interest.5 4 The rules do
not provide guidance on positional conflicts occurring when two clients have
differing political or ideological views, or economic or legal interests that
affect each other adversely.5 5 In the rarefied atmosphere of appellate prac-
tice, such conflicts can and do occur.
In certain polarized areas of the law, law firms customarily represent only
one viewpoint. For example, in the labor relations field, a law firm often
becomes known as either a management firm or a union firm. 56 A firm with
substantial union clientele would be wary of taking an isolated management
case. Similarly, in the area of personal injury actions, attorneys most often
align themselves as either plaintiffs' attorneys or defense counsel. 57
51. See, e.g., Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1976); Fordham,
There are Substantial Limitations on Representation of Clients in Litigation Which Are Not
Obvious in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 Bus. LAW. 1193 (1978); Goldberg, The
Former Client's Disqualification Gambit.: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72
MINN. L. REV. 227 (1987); Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of
Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra
note 12, chs. 7-8 (discussing conflicts of interest issues); Annotation, Representation of Con-
flicting Interests as Disqualifying Attorneyfrom Acting in a Civil Case, 31 A.L.R.3D 715 (1970)
(concerning issue of whether attorney representation of conflicting interests is sufficient reason
to disqualify attorney in civil cases); Annotation, What Constitutes Representation of Conflict-
ing Interests Subjecting Attorney to Disciplinary Action, 17 A.L.R.3D 835 (1968) (concerning
issue of whether attorney representation of conflicting interests will result in disciplinary ac-
tion against attorney).
52. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 & EC 5-4 to 5-10
(1980).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-.11 (1983).
54. See Kindregan, Conflicts of Interests and the Lawyer in Civil Practice, 10 VAL. U.L.
REV. 423 (1976); R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, §§ 3.4.4, 3.5, 3.6 (discussing
lawyer's adverse interest, simultaneous representation, and subsequent representation,
respectively).
55. Breger, Disqualification for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid Attorney, 62 B.U.L.
REV. 1115, 1119 (1982). The phrase "positional conflict" was apparently coined by O'Dea,
The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered. Methods for Avoiding Conflicts of Interest, Mal-
practice Liability and Disqualification, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 701 n.32 (1979). Under-
wood and Fortune further refined the concept by identifying a particular subtype of positional
conflict, the issue conflict, which arises "because two clients have antagonistic interests regard-
ing a legal question in different pending cases." R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note
8, § 3.4.3, at 84. This Article primarily addresses the issue conflict, while recognizing the
potential for issue conflicts even in the absence of different pending cases. Parties may still
have identifiable antagonistic legal positions. The decision in one pending case may affect a
party's legal interest in ways other than direct litigation (i.e., settlement or business strategy).
The American Law Institute captions the concept as "[c]oncurrently taking adverse legal posi-
tions on behalf of different clients." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW; THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LAWYERS § 209 comment f (Preliminary Draft No. 4A, 1989) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
56. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 124.
57. There are even competing bar associations: the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America for the plaintiff bar, the Defense Research and Trial Lawyer Association for the
defendant bar. LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION DIRECTORY 30, 40 (S. Wasserman & J.
O'Brien eds. 1986).
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One recent area of polarization, at least in the oil and gas regions of the
country, involves litigation on natural gas purchase contracts. 58 Most firms
represent either producers or pipelines exclusively, at least on issues touch-
ing upon gas purchase contracts. There is good reason for this polarization.
The litigation anatomy of gas contract litigation, particularly its major com-
ponent, the take-or-pay clause, 59 does not vary much from case to case. The
main controversy surrounds the affirmative defenses the pipeline might raise
in justification of its failure to perform the obligations imposed by the take-
or-pay clause. These affirmative defenses are generally generic to the entire
take-or-pay litigation arena, and the elements of these generic defenses (such
as commercial impracticability, public policy, federal preemption) are basi-
cally similar, both factually and legally. 60 Thus, a legal victory, particularly
an appellate ruling, as take-or-pay law consists mostly of unpublished dis-
trict court orders, 6 1 on one of the generic defenses has import beyond the
narrow confines of the particular case at issue. Further, having successfully
prevailed (in an unpublished decision) on a motion to strike a generic affirm-
ative defense, for example, the attorney might be ethically obligated to dis-
close that otherwise obscure decision to a court in a subsequent case where
the attorney is representing a pipeline client. 62 Moreover, an attorney repre-
senting both producers and pipelines, who achieves on appeal a producer
victory such as in Golsen v. ONG Western,6 3 might have difficulty explaining
58. Historically, gas production was sold at the wellhead to pipeline purchasers under
long-term contracts. The long-term gas purchase contracts usually dedicated the producer's
gas production exclusively to the pipeline purchaser. See Gilliam, Gas Sales Contracts in a
Changing Market, 37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 6-1 (1986): Johnson, Natural Gas
Contracts, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 83 (1983); Turner, Natural Gas-Impact of
Deregulation or Reregulation on Sales Contracts, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 501 (1983).
The current gas surplus has led to considerable litigation in the gas-producing states. See
Medina, The Take-or-Pay Wars. A Further Status Report, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 381 (1988); Me-
dina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate.: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay
Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185 (1987).
59. The take-or-pay clause of a natural gas contract requires the buyer to purchase a
minimum volume of natural gas each year. If the buyer fails to purchase the required volume,
the buyer must pay for the gas as if the buyer had actually accepted delivery of the required
volume. See 4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL & GAS LAW § 724.5(H) (1985).
60. Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 58, at 210-11; Dzienkowski, Regulating the
Conduct of Oil and Gas Lawyers 12 (Nov. 1987) (paper delivered to Second Natural Gas
Contracts Conference). In Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. H-86-
2189 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1987), ANR sought to disqualify the law firm representing the plain-
tiffs on the basis that the law firm had previously represented ANR's predecessor in take-or-
pay litigation. One of the attorneys representing the plaintiff had extensive prior access to
ANR's records. The court declined to disqualify the law firm, noting that take-or-pay litiga-
tion involved "a recurring fact pattern which the same defenses are commonly asserted to a
standard industry contract."
61. Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 58, at 211.
62. See Dzienkowski, supra note 60, at 12. The American Law Institute does not view
"[m]erely indirect precedential effect on another client's legal position" as a conflict, but does
not address the disclosure obligation the attorney may have to the court. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 55, § 209 comment f, at 196.
63. 756 P.2d 1209 (Okla. 1988). In Golsen the Oklahoma Supreme Court narrowly con-
strued the application of force majeure clauses in take-or-pay contracts. Id. at 1212-14. The
court also ruled that certain Oklahoma gas conservation statutes and rules did not operate to
limit the producer's ability to extract gas from the ground and therefore did not provide a
defense to the pipeline. Id. at 1214-16. Golsen is significant since it is the first expression by
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the victory to his pipeline clients.
The only guidance provided by the Model Rules for this conundrum is a
short comment paragraph to rule 1.7.64 As Professors Hazard and Hodes
observe, however, the tension between the antagonistic objectives of the cli-
ents might rise to a level sufficient to implicate the values of rule 1.7(b). 65
Rule 1.7(b) proscribes employment if the representation of that client is sub-
stantially limited due to conflicting loyalty to another client.66 Thus, in the
take-or-pay context, a producer attorney might not be able to accept em-
ployment to represent a pipeline because his producer clients might feel be-
trayed. 67 Should his producer clients not object, however, the lawyer would
be free to represent the pipeline, as it is recognized that lawyers with special
expertise can be expected to represent both sides of a legal issue. 68
the Oklahoma Supreme Court on take-or-pay clauses. See Medina, supra note 58, at 401-03,
410-11; Wood, The Allocation of Risk in Gas Purchase Contracts After Golsen v. ONG W.,
Inc., 13 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 503 (1988).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983) provides:
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal ques-
tion that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would
be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions
in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases
pending at the same time in an appellate court.
Not all commentators have accepted the logic for the distinction between trial and appellate
proceedings. The mechanical distinction ignores the persuasive value of trial court decisions.
See R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 3.4.3; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at
355 n.l I; Parr, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in the Area of Natural Resources Law, 30 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 1.05[4], at n.134 (1984); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 209
comment f, at 196 (making no distinction between trial and appellate courts).
65. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 124. Under the American Law Institute
analysis, the tension point is reached when a lawyer contemporaneously argues both sides of
an unsettled issue of law in the same court on behalf of different clients. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 55, § 209 comment f, at 196.
66. MODEL RULE 1.7(b) proscribes representation of a client if such representation is
"materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer's own interests." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983);
see Dzienkowski, supra note 60, at 13.
67. One legal scholar observed that "the representation might be considered disloyal by
clients who, although not directly affected, reasonably believe that a lawyer who benefits from
their work should be consistent in his position on issues of interest to them." Parr, supra note
64, § 1.05[4], at 1-33; see also G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 124. As Dzienkow-
ski noted, the attorney should counsel both the existing client and the potential client, and
make an independent determination on the conflict. Dzienkowski, supra note 60, at 13.
68. RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 209 comment f, illustration 6; 1 G. HAZARD & W.
HODES, supra note 17, at 148-49; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 7.2.1; Parr, supra note 64,
§ 1.05[4]. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); cf Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F.
Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dual representation would be inappropriate). Hazard and
Hodes observed:
Although some might say that the spectacle of the same lawyer arguing both
sides of the same proposition damages the image of the legal profession, it can
also be said that it instead shows the profession at its best. So long as there are
non-frivolous legal arguments to be made, lawyers should be proud to acknowl-
edge that as detached professionals they are capable of asserting either side.
I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 150. The issue of disqualification, if raised in
litigation, is a decision for the court, and consent will not be an absolute assurance that the
conflict would be waived by the court. Kessalhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl.
1977); Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 391 N.E.2d 1355 (1979); 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH,
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Other examples of possible positional conflicts are: (1) a legal aid office's
representation of landlords; 69 (2) a legal aid office's representation of individ-
ual indigents with interests that differ from those of community groups tra-
ditionally favored by the office; 70 (3) a lawyer who represents corporate
entities whose business is exploiting natural resources has the opportunity to
represent a surface landowner; 7 1 (4) a lawyer represents banks; a debtor has
a dispute with a bank that is not one of the lawyer's clients; the debtor's case
presents a good opportunity to narrow the holder in due course rule;7 2 (5) a
law firm has an associate who represents a citizen group advocating clean air
and opposing strip mining; a coal company wants the firm to serve as general
counsel;73 (6) a client labor union wishes to argue for a broad interpretation
of a federal law; a corporate client, in another case, wishes to plead for a
narrow interpretation of the same federal law;74 and (7) a law firm that rep-
resents tobacco industry clients and an associate's participation, as part of
the firm's pro bono policy, in a Nader-like health group seeking to expand
government intervention in general health concerns.75
What should a lawyer do when faced with a significant positional conflict?
The lawyer should consider the likelihood of the issue being raised in each
litigation, the likely impact of a decision in favor of one client on the inter-
ests of the positionally opposite client, and the importance of the issue. 76
The lawyer should counsel the clients, fully disclosing the possible positional
conflict, and obtain their consents to representation. Through the use of
Model Rule 1.2(c), the attorney might limit representation of one client so as
to eliminate the positional conflict. 77 When the limitation of representation
option is unavailable and one client feels strongly that representation of both
interests is impossible, the attorney should withdraw from representation of
one of the clients.7 8
supra note 11, § 12.13; R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 3.7.2; see RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 55, § 202(1) comment c (discussing nonconsentable conflicts).
69. Breger, supra note 55, at 1134.
70. Id. For example, the individual indigent wishes to oppose affirmative action in
employment.
71. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 85 (3d ed. 1984); Parr, supra note 64, § 1.0514].
72. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 147-49.
73. See Legal Ethics Forum, Dealing With Conflicting Interests Within a Firm, 67 A.B.A.
J. 1692 (1981).
74. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 142; cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 55,
§ 209 comment f, illustrations 5-6 (lawyer advocating contradictory interpretations of tax rules
for different clients).
75. See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 630 (1985).
76. RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 209 comment f, illustrations 5-6, at 196 (concluding
"whether a conflict exists will require a fact-specific analysis of each situation"); C. WOLFRAM,
supra note 12, § 7.3.3; Dzienkowski, supra note 60, at 11.
77. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1983) permits an attorney,
upon full disclosure and consent of the client, to limit his representation of that client. See
supra note 49. For example, a law firm heavily involved in representing labor might limit its
representation of a corporate client to matters unrelated to labor-management issues. I G.
HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 25.
78. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 209 comment f, R. UNDERWOOD & W. FOR-
TUNE, supra note 8, §§ 3.4.3, 3.7.1, 3.7.3. The issue then becomes one of serial representation
of conflicting interests, governed by MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9
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The day has long since passed when a lawyer was viewed as the functional
analogue of a taxi driver, whom any client could summon for any trip to any
destination within the limits of the law. 79 Since clients are more possessive
of their attorneys' loyalties, positional conflicts, like the more traditional
conflicts of interest, must be treated with seriousness by the bar.80
III. CANDOR TO THE APPELLATE COURT
The appellate attorney most often faces the twin horns of responsibility to
both court and client when grappling with the obligation of candor to the
court. 8 1 This situation represents the most severe tension between the duty
to the client and the duty to the court. 82 The attorney has a dual trust.8 3
When the two trusts conflict, the duty to the court supersedes the attorney's
duty to the client. 8 4 The appellate structure provides a number of situations
(1983). In the words of the Oregon Supreme Court, upon the attorney's withdrawal of repre-
sentation of one client, the conflict would cease to be an "open file" conflict and would become
a "closed file" conflict. In re Brandsness, 299 Or. 417, 702 P.2d 1098, 1101 (1985); see I G.
HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 174-86; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 7.4; Note,
Former-Client Conflicts. The Substantial Relationship Test and the Presumption of Divulgence,
12 J. LEGAL PROF. 219 (1987); Note, A Dilemma in Professional Responsibility: The Subse-
quent Representation Problem, 50 UMKC L. REV. 165 (1982); Annotation, Disqualification of
Law Firm from Representing Party in Federal Civil Suit Involving Former Client of that Firm,
56 A.L.R. FED. 189 (1982); Annotation, Propriety and Effect of Attorney Representing Interest
Adverse to That of Former Client, 52 A.L.R.2D 1243 (1957).
79. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 124.
80. Positional conflicts are unlikely to be asserted as grounds for disqualification; cases are
therefore wanting. See O'Dea, supra note 55, at 701 n.32. The lack of case law, however,
should not reassure the bar. A positional conflict, especially if undisclosed, could make a
client feel that his attorney's vigor in prosecuting his cause was tempered by the interests of the
other clients, leading to either malpractice consideration, bar grievance procedures, or simply
loss of the client. Dzienkowski, supra note 60, at 13; Parr, supra note 64, § 1.05[4]. See gener-
ally Annotation, Failure to Communicate with Client as Basis for Disciplinary Action Against
Attorney, 80 A.L.R.3D 1240 (1977) (cases dealing with issue of whether allegations of attor-
ney's failure to communicate are sufficient basis for disciplinary action and what discipline is
appropriate).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(a) (1980). Rule 3.3(b) specifically provides that the
obligation of candor applies even if disclosure of information otherwise protected by privilege
would be required.
82. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 345.
83. A concise summary of this duty is espoused by one court:
All lawyers admitted to practice undertake a "dual trust": a duty to this Court
to observe all appropriate standards of professional conduct and responsibility,
and an obligation to their client to advance the client's cause to the best of their
ability without allowing any conflicting loyalty or obligation to interfere.
In re Education Law Center, Inc., 86 N.J. 124, 429 A.2d 1051, 1056 (1981); see also People v.
Beattie, 137 Il. 553, 27 N.E. 1096 (1891) (attorney disbarred for knowingly allowing client to
give false testimony and for wrongfully introducing evidence that would have been in-
admissable without client's false testimony); In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194
N.E. 313 (1935) (judicial department of government could constitutionally remove disloyal
attorneys from the bar).
84. Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1985); Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 676 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. I11. 1987); State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966); In re Integration
of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937); Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21,
521 P.2d 964 (1974). For example, to avoid fraud on the court, the attorney may disclose
confidential communications. People v. Pickier, 186 I11. 64, 57 N.E. 893 (1900) (attorney dis-
barred for inducing court to allow appeal through posting of appeal bond by people known by
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when the appellate lawyer is confronted with choosing between a course of
conduct good for the client and a course of conduct true to the court.
A. Advancing a Moot Appeal
The client, a manufacturer of widgets, has unsuccessfully litigated a price
discount case against one of its retailers. The client's counsel has filed the
appropriate papers to perfect the appeal. Briefing has concluded and a deci-
sion is expected. The parties then settle. Part of the settlement provides that
neither party will disclose to the appellate court the fact of settlement. The
client wants a definitive court ruling on the issues presented at trial. The
opposing party no longer cares one way or the other. What is the attorney's
obligation to the court? The appellate court in question has unequivocally
stated that it would not decide moot or fictitious appeals.A5 Both the Model
Code8 6 and the Model Rules direct the attorney not to commit acts fraudu-
lent to the court.8 7
The attorney apparently does have an obligation to inform the appellate
court of the settlement and seek its determination whether or not the appeal
will be dismissed. Amherst & Clarence Insurance Co. v. Cazenovia Tavern,
Inc. 88 is very similar to the hypothetical. On appeal, the issue was whether
an insurer had an obligation to defend the appellant in an underlying tort
action. The underlying action settled. The court rejected any suggestion
that the parties could agree to keep a case alive after settlement, stating that
attorneys are obliged to keep the court fully informed of all matters pertinent
to the appeal and are prohibited from agreeing to keep a moot appeal alive.89
Chief Justice Taney stated long ago that the Court should punish attempts
attorney as worthless or fictitious); see I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 345-47;
Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests that Outweigh Confidentiality, 5 J. LEGAL
PROF. 5 (1980). Professor Freedman would give the attorney-client relationship much more
weight. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-8 (1975). Profes-
sor Gaetke advances the thesis that despite the broad dicta of the Model Code and the Model
Rules, the actual workings and precise formulation of those disciplinary codes accomplish the
exact opposite in most cases: the lawyer's obligation to the court is subordinated to his self-
interest or the interests of his client. Gaetke, supra note 44, at 39; see also Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157 (1986) (lawyer's conduct of threatening to disclose perjury to court acceptable
under sixth amendment); United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986) (lawyer has
duty both to prevent and disclose fraud upon court; in communicating fraud to court lawyer
may reveal confidential client information).
85. For a recent discussion of the mootness principle and its underlying policy justifica-
tions, see St. Charles Parish School Bd. v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1987). See also
13A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533
(1984) (§ 3533.10 discusses mootness doctrine on appeal); Greenbaum, Mootness on Appeal in
Federal Courts, A Reexamination of the Consequences of Appellate Disposition, 17 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 7 (1983) (discussing when and how mootness applies); Note, The Mootness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1974) (discussing tension between Supreme
Court's desire to decide only those cases where dispute exists and its desire to use mootness to
serve other purposes).
86. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2) comment (1983) states:
"there are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation."
88. 59 N.Y.2d 983, 453 N.E.2d 1077, 466 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1983).
89. 453 N.E.2d at 1078. Such agreements are not unique, particularly when one party,
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to gain a Court ruling in the absence of a real controversy between liti-
gants. 90 In Board of License Commissioners v. Pastore the Court felt com-
pelled to remind counsel once again of counsel's duty to inform the Court of
any development that might affect the outcome of the case.9 1 The defendant
challenged the revocation of a liquor permit as resulting from evidence dis-
covered during an illegal search. The establishment went out of business.
The Court, unaware of this development, granted certiorari and commenced
oral argument. During oral argument, the Court learned of the establish-
ment's fate. In dismissing the writ of certiorari as moot the Court tartly
observed in its brief per curiam opinion that lawyers must bring such a de-
velopment to the Court's attention immediately.
9 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted this United States Supreme Court
admonition to counsel in St. Charles Parrish School Board v. GAF Corp. 93 In
GAF the parties had settled the case, but had stipulated in the settlement
that $10,000 be set aside pending final resolution by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. If the state's supreme court affirmed the lower court or refrained
from deciding the merits, the school board would get the $10,000. If the
court reversed the lower court, the contractor would retain the $10,000. An
outsider to the settlement informed the court of the settlement after the tri-
bunal had issued its opinion on the merits. On rehearing, the court rejected
the argument that the disposition of the $10,000 prevented application of the
nootness doctrine, finding the sum to be an attempt to obtain a decision on
an issue settled by the parties.
94
An ethics opinion of the City Bar Association of New York preceded the
Louisiana court's holding. 95 The opinion instructed that the attorney who
having obtained a favorable settlement, does not care about the impact of a possible adverse
precedent for the future, but the other party does.
90. Justice Taney said:
[A]ny attempt, by a mere colorable dispute, to obtain the opinion of the court
upon a question of law which a party desires to know for his own interest or his
own purposes, when there is no real and substantial controversy between those
who appear as adverse parties to the suit, is an abuse which courts of justice
have always reprehended, and treated as a punishable contempt of court.
Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1849).
91. 469 U.S. 238, 240 (1985).
92. Id. The Supreme Court stressed: "When a development after this Court grants certi-
orari or notes probable jurisdiction could have the effect of depriving the Court ofjurisdiction
due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development should be called to
the attention of the Court without delay." Id. (emphasis in original).
93. 512 So. 2d 1165, 1173 (La. 1987).
94. Id. at 1172-73. The Louisiana Supreme Court described the scheme as "a stake arbi-
trarily set up in an attempt to have this court continue to litigate what would otherwise be a
dead issue." Id.
95. N.Y. CITY B.A., Op. 422 (1937), as extracted in 0. MARU & R. CLOUGH, supra note
37, 3025; see also Amherst & Clarence Ins. Co. v. Cazenovia Tavern, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 983,
453 N.E.2d 1077 (1983) (court dismissed action as moot due to settlement agreement); H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 75 (1953) (lawyer may not foist fictitious controversy on court); cf
S & D California Fruit Exch., Inc. v. Gurino, 783 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1986) (attorney sanctioned
for not disclosing to appellate court and opposing counsel settlement of case); Citizen State
Bank v. Schneider, 198 N.J. Super. 518, 487 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)
(appellate court acknowledged duty of counsel to inform court promptly of settlement; in this
case, counsel delayed notifying court of settlement until day before oral argument scheduled);
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had lost the first appeal and had paid the judgment could not appeal to a
higher appellate court to get a more authoritative ruling.96 The opinion fur-
ther instructed that the attorneys for the parties may not enter into any
agreement to represent the moot case in the higher court. 97
Sound judicial policy has always favored active controversies with both
sides ably represented. A moot case preserved for appeal by agreement
might deprive the court of the sharp and adversarial briefing process crucial
to appellate decision-making. For example, one party, having achieved a
favorable settlement, might have little concern for the ultimate decision of
the court. That party might instruct its attorneys to pare down their efforts.
The other party, vitally interested in the precedent, would likely go all-out in
seeking a favorable decision. The appellate court might be misled into a
questionable decision by the disparity of briefing efforts. 98 One federal court
noted the deceitful nature of such an attempt.99
B. Statement of Facts and Misquotation
Many appellate rules require that an appellate brief contain a statement of
facts.100 Appellate treatises stress the importance of a well-crafted statement
of facts.' 0' The appellate attorney must give the client the best possible rep-
resentation, yet comply with the requirement of candor imposed by the
courts. As one judge summarized the attorney's obligation:
"It is a minimal requirement to insist that counsel, out of their duty
Annotation, Participation in Allegedly Collusive or Connived Divorce Proceedings as Subjecting
Attorney to Disciplinary Action, 13 A.L.R.3D 1010 (1967) (cases dealing with disciplinary pro-
ceedings against attorneys who participated in allegedly collusive or connived divorce
proceedings).
96. N.Y. CITY B.A., Op. 422, supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 202 comment b, at 33 (concerning lack of ability
of client to consent to the lawyer representing opposing parties in litigation). "An independent
ground for prohibiting conflicts in matters before courts and similar tribunals is to assure that
such matters are presented vigorously and with fair development of each client's position." Id.
For similar reasons, courts have placed strict constraints on the validity of "Mary Carter"
agreements, in which plaintiff and fewer than all defendants secretly agree to limit the financial
liability of the agreeing defendants who nonetheless remain in the case. Such agreements can
distort the adversary process. Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971). See R.
UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 8.8; Note, Mary Carter Agreements: The Un-
solved Evidentiary Problems in Texas, 40 BAY. L. REV. 449 (1988); Note, Mary Carter Agree-
ments: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. L.J. 779 (1978); Annotation, Validity and Effect of
Agreement With One Cotortfeasor Setting His Maximum Liability and Providing for Reduction
or Extinguishment Thereof Relative to Recovery Against Non-Agreeing Cotortfeasor, 65
A.L.R.3D 602 (1975).
99. The court stated "[i]t is one thing to argue that a settlement does not moot a particu-
lar case; it is quite another to promote an advisory opinion by disguising a settlement in order
to hide it from the court's consideration." Douglas v. Donavan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
100. See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 28(a); CAL. CT. R. 13; FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(b)(3); ILL.
SuP. CT. R. 341(e)(6); IOWA. R. APP. P. 14(a)(4); MINN. R. Civ. APP. 128.02(1)(c); OKLA.
SUP. CT. R. 15.
101. See, e.g., M. HoUTs & W. ROGOSHESKE, ART OF ADVOCACY-APPEALS § 30 (1988);
R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 9.9; R. MARTINEAU, supra note 16, § 11.6; R. STERN, supra note 13,
§ 37.20; F. WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS § 23 (1967).
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to the court, shall not deliberately make misstatements of facts." In his
dealings with the appellate court, an attorney should always make full
disclosures and never seek to mislead it into unnecessary action through
artifice or concealment. The court is entitled to a fair statement of the
facts on both sides, not an exaggerated self-serving version or a version
omitting material facts. 102
Attorneys sometimes run afoul of ethical rules when quoting case law.
Attorneys must take care when selecting or editing quotations, which must
fairly reflect the case and should not be lifted out of context. As Canon 22 of
the old Canons of Professional Ethics10 3 of the American Bar Association
provides:
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the con-
tents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the argu-
ment of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a textbook;
or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that
has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed.
Courts often express displeasure upon catching on to counsel's games.
One court, upon discovering counsel selectively editing a crucial statement
of governing law from the New York Court of Appeals, exclaimed, "we do
not like some of the tricks of advocacy indulged in by counsel for appellant
to lend apparent substance to its position."10 4 Perhaps because of the adver-
sarial nature of the system, lawyers sometimes cross the fine line between
forcefully presenting the client's case and misleading the court. A few exam-
ples demonstrate the point.
102. Seidenfeld, supra note 8, at 275 (quoting Zechman v. Zechman, 391 I11. 510, 521, 63
N.W.2d 499, 504 (1945)). An early ethics author stated the point even more forcefully:
An even more flagrant dereliction is presented when counsel garbles, distorts
or knowingly misquotes the language of a statute, decision or text-book, and this
offense is by no means uncommon. An attorney who stoops to such low artifices
not only deserves the severest censure but is positively unworthy to mingle with
honest men in the practice of law. A similar infraction of the ethical code oc-
curs where counsel knowingly misquotes the contents of a document, the testi-
mony of a witness or the language or argument of opposing counsel. No
honorable attorney will ever be guilty of the foregoing or kindred deceitful prac-
tices, and persons resorting thereto should be subjected to discipline.
G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 196-97 (2d ed. 1902).
103. The Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the ABA in 1908 and were ap-
plied, as amended, until the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in
1969. For discussions of the Canons, see H. DRINKER, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1953);
Smith, The Texas Canons of Ethics Revisited, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 183 (1966); Sutton, Guide-
lines to Professional Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 391 (1961); Wright, A Study of the Canons
of Professional Ethics, I CATH. LAW. 323 (1965); Sutton, A Re-evaluation of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, 33 TENN. L. REV. 129 (1966). The Canons were adopted largely from
earlier canons of the Alabama Bar Association, which in turn were derived from Hoffman's
Fifty Resolutions. See Akers, Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions, 14 ALA. LAW. 171 (1953); Jones,
The Canons of Professional Ethics. Their Genesis and History, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 483
(1932); Jones, First Code of Legal Ethics Adopted in the United States, 8 A.B.A. J. 111 (1922).
104. Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Munro-Langsroth, Inc., 269 F.2d 64, 67 (1st. Cir. 1959).
Underwood & Fortune identify several categories of candor violations: (1) misrepresentation
of what a case holds; (2) distortion of case law or statute law; (3) nondisclosure or misstate-
ment of critical facts, and (4) statements of purported fact unsupported by the record. R.
UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 8.5.
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In McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. 105 an attorney
appealed an order directing him personally to pay $1,000 of defendant's at-
torney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that
the attorney had not litigated in good faith.10 6 In support of the district
court's finding, the appellate court noted that counsel had misquoted and
thus misrepresented a case by omitting a sentence that undercut his posi-
tion. 107 In Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Industries, Inc. 108 the court found
an appeal frivolous, partially because the appellant had quoted a portion of
the jury charge entirely out of context and with a misleading elision.' 0 9 In
Quality Molding Co. v. American National Fire Insurance Co. 110 the court
discovered a misstatement. Appellate counsel had omitted a critical passage
from a quote and had placed a period in the quote where one in fact did not
exist, both of which problems had first appeared in the trial court brief and
had been pointed out to trial counsel.'I' Because appellate counsel had not
conducted the trial, the court gave him the benefit of the doubt concerning
his knowledge of the misquotation and declined to impose sanctions." 12
Quality Control also illustrates another important point. Attorneys must
beware of lifting material from briefs that they have not prepared. Attor-
neys must at least read the cases to assure themselves that they are cited
accurately. Other courts might not be as forgiving as the Seventh Circuit.' 13
105. 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 202.
107. Id.
108. 641 F.2d 1361 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 1366.
110. 287 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1961).
111. Id. at 316.
112. Id. at 315-16; see also Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1988) (criti-
cizing attorney for misrepresenting concurring opinion of state supreme court as "particularly
instructive," when the basis of that concurring opinion was rejected by the majority opinion;
court declined, however, to impose sanctions); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th
Cir.) (awarding portion of double costs and fees personally against attorney in part for attor-
ney's serious misstatement of governing Illinois law), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986);
Malhiot v. Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1984) (awarding
damages of $1,500 under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because briefs contained intentional misstatement
of California law); Siple & Orrock v. Rechnitzer (In re M.B.K., Inc.), 92 Bankr. 429, 436
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (sanctioning attorney and client $3,200 for misusing citations); In re
Murray, 216 Ind. 295, 24 N.E.2d 288, 289 (1939) (suspending attorney from practice before
Indiana Supreme Court for modifying transcript without proper approval); Sobol v. Capital
Management Consultants, 102 Nev. 444, 726 P.2d 335, 337 (1986) (sanctioning attorney
$5,000 in part for citing language in federal case as if from majority when quoted language was
from dissent); In re Huggins, 168 Okla. 91, 31 P.2d 944, 947 (1934) (disbarring attorney for
preparing falsified transcript); Orleck v. Nemtzow, 59 R.I. 284, 195 A. 234, 240 (1937) (cau-
tioning attorney about alleged quotation from case, which upon examination "was a combina-
tion of disconnected phrases from widely separated parts of that opinion, without indicating
intervening omissions"); Grogen v. State, 745 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ) (referring attorney who misstated holdings of cases to Texas Disciplinary
Review Committee); Uviller, supra note 8, at 731-33 (questioning liberal use of conflicting
authorities, mislabeling case significance, and misstating holding of case).
113. E.g., Pravic v. U.S. Industries-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 622-23 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(rule II sanctions appropriate where attorney relied entirely on inaccurate memorandum pre-
pared by law firm representing co-defendant in state court case; of the two cases cited in mem-
orandum, one was overruled and the other was not on point); see also R. LYNN, supra note 8,
§§ 9.2-.3 (advising attorneys to check others' research).
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Selective cropping of the record is also unethical. In Amstar Corp. v. En-
virotech Corp. 114 Envirotech had deleted portions from the prosecution his-
tory in order to bolster its claim. The deleted portions totally undermined
Envirotech's argument. "Distortion of the record, by deletion of critical lan-
guage in quoting from the record, reflects a lack of the candor required by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 (1983) .... ,,ll5 The
court ordered Envirotech to pay double costs. 116
Similarly, in Frausto v. Legal Aid Society 1 7 the appellant's attorney had
selectively edited the district court's remarks to make it appear that the dis-
trict court was prejudiced against Mexican-Americans. The Ninth Circuit,
in commenting on appellate counsel's performance, set forth the behavior
expected of appellate counsel:
It is appellate counsel's professional duty to be scrupulously accurate
in referring to the record and the authorities upon which he relies in his
presentation to the court in his brief or oral argument. He must not
mislead the court by misrepresenting the record. Vigorous representa-
tion is admirable, but it does not permit misrepresentation.' 18
Two particularly blatant examples of cropping illustrate the need for ethi-
cal conduct by the attorney. Courts especially need factual candor in emer-
gency or ex parte proceedings, where a detailed examination of the record
114. 730 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 924 (1984).
115. 730 F.2d at 1486.
116. Id.
117. 563 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1977).
118. Id. at 1327 n.8; see also Mays v. Chicago Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134, 139-40 (7th Cir.
1989) (sanctioning attorney in part for falsely asserting prior hiring practices had been previ-
ously cited by appellate court as disgraceful); Thornber v. Fort Walton Beach, 534 So. 2d 754,
755-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (publicly reprimanding attorney for attempting to use appel-
late rule allowing inclusion of matter outside of record created below into record); Zechman v.
Zechman, 391 I11. 510, 63 N.E.2d 499, 504 (1945) (criticizing attorney for preparing mislead-
ing abstract of record); Fogel v. Hodes, 68 111. App. 3d 594, 386 N.E.2d 389, 393-94 (1979)
(dismissing appeal because defendants, in preparing abstract of record, omitted much of the
testimony favorable to plaintiff); Ashbaugh v. State, 272 Ind. 557, 400 N.E.2d 767, 772 (1980)
(urging care by attorneys in quoting record after important portions of record purported to be
quoted omitted material without indication of such omission, resulting in incomplete presenta-
tion of the issue); Lopizzo v. Burke, 198 N.J. Super. 359, 486 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985) (censoring plaintiff's attorney for intentionally omitting from appellate index cop-
ies of letters damaging to plaintiff's appeal cited by trial court in its decision); Texas Comm. on
the Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, Op. 189 (1959), published in 18 BAYLOR L. REV.
283-84 (1966) (improper to misrepresent facts to the court); N.Y. COUNTY B.A. Op. 40 (1914),
digested in 0. MARU & R. CLOUGH, supra note 37, 1655 (statements likely to mislead court
should be avoided); cf In re Murray, 216 Ind. 295, 24 N.E.2d 288, 289 (1939) (suspended and
reprimanded attorney for modifying transcript without proper approval); In re Huggins, 168
Okla. 91, 31 P.2d 944, 947 (1934) (disbarred attorney for preparing falsified transcript).
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below is impractical.' 1 9 In State v Weinstein 120 the realtors sought to pro-
hibit a particular judge from proceeding in a case. The court of appeals had
issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. The court had based its decision on
realtors' petition, which seemed to establish that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction because of an apparent defective summons served upon the real-
tors. The parties did not inform the court of appeals at the time of issuance
of the preliminary writ that realtors had made a general entry of appearance
and a request that the circuit court permit realtors' counsel to examine cer-
tain files. After full consideration of the case, the court of appeals discovered
the existence of the general appearance. The court then expressed it displea-
sure at counsel's conduct:
Had we been so informed [of the entry of appearance] our Preliminary
Writ of Prohibition would not have been issued and thus the writing of
this opinion would have been unnecessary and the consequent delay in
the Juvenile Court proceeding would have been avoided .... We think
it was the responsibility and duty of realtors' attorney to give us a frank
and complete resume of all the actions he had taken in the Juvenile
Court proceeding .... 121
In Addison v. Brown 122 the court had scheduled criminal defendants for
trial. By petition filed with the appellate court a few days before the trial
was to have commenced, the defendants sought to prohibit the trial, alleging
a violation of the Florida speedy trial rule. The appellate court ordered the
state to respond. That order served as a stay of the trial. Upon receiving the
state's response, the court learned that defendants had obtained at least three
continuances and had waived speedy trial. The appellate court found the
breach of professional conduct unintentional. 23 The court did, however,
remand for assessment of fees against the attorney for the defendants, along
with costs incurred by the state in summoning and paying witnesses and
veniremen for scheduled trial.12 4 Noting the emergency nature of the relief
requested, the court stated:
[T]his [the obligation of candor] is especially important when the relief
requested is urgently sought and the time insufficient to allow the oppo-
sition to present a response .... Therefore, where a last minute petition
119. Model Rule 3.3(d) imposes a higher burden on counsel in ex parte proceedings to
inform the court fully of all known material facts necessary for an informed decision, whether
the facts are adverse or not. See In re State v. Dear, 532 So. 2d 902, 904 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(full disclosure required of all relevant facts in an ex parte proceeding); In re Adoption No.
85365027, 71 Md. App. 362, 525 A.2d 1081, 1086 (1987); 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra
note 17, at 349; cf Trigg v. Criminal Court, 234 Ind. 609, 130 N.E.2d 461, 464 (1955) (counsel
perpetuated fraud on Indiana Supreme Court by presenting petition for writ of prohibition
containing misrepresentations and referring matter to disciplinary committee). The Model
Code is silent on the matter.
120. 411 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
121. Id. at 274-75. Although Weinstein was not an ex parte proceeding, the emergency
nature of the preliminary relief probably made any detailed examination of the record below
impracticable.
122. 413 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd per curiamn sub nom. Lubin v. Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, 428 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1983).
123. 413 So. 2d at 1241.
124. Id.
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is filed it is mandatory that counsel not only act in good faith, but that
the petition and the attached appendix accurately and completely reflect
all factual matters which may affect this court's decision. 125
Making false statements not supported by the record below is also unethi-
cal. The court will ultimately discover the fraud perpetrated on it; thus such
behavior is also poor strategy. 126 In In re Chakeres,2 7 a disciplinary pro-
ceeding, the New Mexico Supreme Court publicly censured an attorney for
representing to the appellate court at four different times that certain casu-
alty testimony was uncontroverted.1 2 8 At the proceeding, the attorney ac-
knowledged that the testimony on the casualty issue was inconsistent. In
Loza v. State 129 appellant's assertion that he had challenged certain instruc-
tions given below troubled the Indiana Supreme Court. Upon reviewing the
record, the court found no such challenge.' 30  In DCD Programs, Ltd. v.
125. Id.
126. Sigmond v. Brown (In re Boucher), 837 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), modified, 850 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1988). The court in Sigmond observed: "Misrepresentation of the record on appeal
is poor strategy. Alert opponents will detect the error. An appellate panel of three judges
assisted by a staff of able law clerks will confirm what the opponents point out or will itself
uncover the defects." Id. at 871. The Indiana Supreme Court reiterated the same point in
Cooper v. State, 261 Ind. 659, 309 N.E.2d 807 (1974), noting that -[w]hen the Court finds that
it can not rely upon the statement of a lawyer, the lawyer has lost his effectiveness with the
Court and has therefore, in fact, injured his client." Id. at 808; see also Medina, Discretionary
Review in the Oklahoma Supreme Court: A Practical Guide to the Exercise of the Court's Certi-
orari Jurisdiction, 13 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 257, 274 (1988) (recommending attorneys state
facts accurately and fairly).
127. 101 N.M. 684, 687 P.2d 741 (1984).
128. 687 P.2d at 742.
129. 263 Ind. 124, 325 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
130. 325 N.E.2d at 179. The Loza court commented: "We are greatly disturbed by what
appears to be a growing tendency among a number of lawyers to be careless, if not deliberately
misleading, in their representations to the Court through their briefs." Id; see also Holcomb v.
Colony Bay Coal Co., 852 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 1988) (imposing double costs on attorney for
intentionally misstating the record in both briefs and in oral argument); Borowski v. DePuy,
Inc., 850 F.2d 297, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1988) (sanctioning attorney for misrepresenting to appel-
late court filing status of deposition testimony); Sigmond v. Brown (In re Boucher), 837 F.2d
869, 871 (9th Cir.) (suspending attorney for six months as sanction for numerous misrepresen-
tations in appellate brief), modified, 850 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1988) (revoking suspension on
rehearing and instead censoring because of youth and inexperience); In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004,
1007 (9th Cir. 1986) (imposing public admonishment for unintentional mischaracterization
that Mexican judgment was entered in client's favor); Herzefeld & Stern v. Blair, 769 F.2d 645,
647 (10th Cir. 1985) (imposing fees against appellant's attorney in part for many instances
where his references to record were contrary to what was actually found in record); Optical
Eyewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1985) (court, "af-
fronted" by counsel's misrepresentation of the facts during oral argument, awarding double
costs and fees jointly against attorney and his client); Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 737
F.2d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding punitive sanctions appropriate for misstatements and
misrepresentations in appellate brief); In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 1974) (warn-
ing attorney brief replete with statements of purported fact not supported by or actually con-
tradicted by record violates Canons of Code of Professional Responsibility); Hutchins v.
Hutchins, 501 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1987) (ordering attorneys personally to pay
$300 fee to opposing counsel for misrepresenting facts concerning invocation of fifth amend-
ment privilege); People ex rel. Morris v. Moutray, 166 Il. 630, 47 N.E. 79, 81 (1897) (disbar-
ring attorney for willfully altering bill of exceptions and relying on altered bill of exceptions on
appeal); Cooper v. State, 261 Ind. 659, 309 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1974) (criticizing attorney for
making unwarranted characterization of facts as uncontroverted); State ex rel. Attorney Gen-
eral v. Harber, 129 Mo. 271, 31 S.W. 889, 900 (1895) (disbarring attorney for falsifying tran-
script); Sobol v. Capital Management Corp., 102 Nev. 444, 726 P.2d 335, 337 (1986) (imposing
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Leighton, 131 the Ninth Circuit suspended an attorney from practice for two
months for negligently misrepresenting the record. 132 The appeal involved
the lower court's denial of a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
The issue centered on whether the district court had given reasons for its
denial. Absent specific reasons, the lower court would have abused its dis-
cretion in denying the motion. The attorney for the appellee represented on
both oral argument and in briefs that the court below had specifically found
no just reason for delay. The lower court did not direct that finding, how-
ever, to the denial of the motion for leave to amend. Rather, the finding
concerned the district court's certification under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(b), which permits an immediate appeal. Finding a violation of
ethical rules and citing Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c),' 3 3 the
court summarized the appellate counsel's burden: "[C]ounsel's professional
duty requires scrupulous accuracy in referring to the record. A court should
not have to pour over an extensive record as an alternative to relying on
counsel's representations. The court relies on counsel to state clearly, can-
didly, and accurately the record as it in fact exists."' 134
Counsel must also be careful when stating the facts of the case not to
assert inferences as facts. Attorneys may properly assert the inferences, but
they may not clothe such inferences in the garb of facts. 1 35 In addition,
when lifting material from published sources, such as law review articles,
counsel should identify the source. The Indiana Supreme Court, after find-
ing that appellate counsel had lifted, without attribution, ten pages of an
ALR annotation, observed that "[a] brief is not a document thrown together
without either organized thought or intelligent editing on the part of the
brief-writer." 136
sanctions for misrepresenting stipulated fact); Cornell v. Albuquerque Chem. Co., 92 N.M.
121, 584 P.2d 168, 171 (1978) (holding that if counsel makes false statements in brief, he is
guilty of misconduct); Merl v. Merl, 128 A.D.2d 685, 686, 513 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1987)
(admonishing attorney for briefs containing fabricated facts and material); In re Norton, 106
Utah 179, 146 P.2d 899, 900-01 (1944) (suspending attorney for intentionally misrepresenting
to supreme court exhibit one had been admitted into evidence instead of offered and refused).
131. 846 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1988).
132. Id. at 528.
133. The rule provides:
A court of appeals may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show
cause to the contrary, and after hearing, if requested, take any appropriate disci-
plinary action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct un-
becoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with these rules or any
rule of the court.
FED. R. App. P. 46(c).
134. 846 F.2d at 528; see also Mays v. Chicago Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134, 139-40 (7th Cir.
1989) (sanctioning attorney $1,000 under FED. R. APP. P. 46(c) for representing in brief dis-
puted facts as undisputed facts).
135. In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46, 47 (1954); see also In re Kelly, 808 F.2d
549, 552 (7th Cir. 1986) (making same point concerning facts alleged in a recusal affidavit).
136. Frith v. State, 325 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. 1975). In a similar view, an Illinois appellate
court observed that "[t]he appellate court is not a depository in which the appellant may dump
the burden of argument and research." Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 145 I11. App. 3d 712,
495 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (1986); cf Comment, Plagiarism in Legal Scholarship, 15 U. TOL. L.
REV. 233 (1983) (discussing In re Lamberis, 93 I11. 2d 222, 443 N.E.2d 549 (1982), where an
attorney was disbarred for plagiarizing his master's thesis).
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C Disclosure of Adverse Legal Precedent
A more painful dilemma seldom confronts the appellate lawyer. The fol-
lowing hypothetical illustrates the problem: The attorney represents the ap-
pellee in a case in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, where Oklahoma
substantive law provides the rule of decision. The appellant has already filed
a brief, and incredibly, has missed a decision by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court that addresses nearly identical issues on similar facts; the case strongly
favors the appellant on one of the issues. The appellee's counsel is preparing
the answer brief. Does the appellee's attorney disclose the case to the court
and the appellant? The answer is: Yes, the appellee's attorney is ethically
compelled to disclose the adverse precedent. 137
Although the contours of the obligation have changed somewhat, the ba-
sic duty of disclosure of adverse precedent 138 is longstanding, 139 if not al-
ways followed. 140 In ABA Formal Opinion 146, the ABA Committee of
137. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983). For a general discussion, see 1 G.
HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 352-53; R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note
8, § 8.5. In addition, local court rules might, independently of the ethical regulations, require
disclosure. See, e.g., Scarborough Constructors, Inc. v. Pace Constr. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1222
(M.D. Fla. 1988) (holding counsel had duty under Local Court Rule 104(c) to bring promptly
to the court's attention the existence of any other similar case or proceeding pending before
any other court). In stark contrast are both the Model Code's and the Model Rule's omissions
of any corresponding duty to disclose adverse facts. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8;
Gaetke, supra note 3, at 88-89; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1057-59 (1975); Freedman, Arguing the Law in An Adversary System, 16 GA. L.
REV. 833 (1982); Hazard, Arguing the Law. The Advocate's Duty and Opportunity, 16 GA. L.
REV. 821 (1982); Smith & Metzloff, The Attorney As Advocate: Arguing the Law, 16 GA. L.
REV. 841 (1982); Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REV. 575, 585-86
(1961); Turnstall, Ethics in Citation: A Plea for Re-Interpretation of a Canon, 35 A.B.A. J. 5
(1949); Weinstein, Judicial Notice and the Duty to Disclose Adverse Information, 51 IOWA L.
REV. 807, 808-14 (1966); Comment, The Duty to Disclose Adverse Cases, 17 ALA. L. REV. 331
(1965) [hereinafter Comment, The Duty to Disclose]; Panel Discussion, Problems in Litigation,
31 CANADIAN B. REV. 503, 506-08 (1953); Note, The Attorney's Duty of Disclosure, 31 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 283 (1957) [hereinafter Note, The Attorney's Duty].
138. The obligation to cite adverse precedent is not limited to court cases. Indeed, the
obligation to refer to ordinances, regulations, and administrative rulings is probably more im-
portant to the principles of Model Rule 3.3 as the court is less likely to discover these sorts of
authority on its own. I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 353. There is, however,
no obligation to cite all the authority in support of your position. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
139. See Weinstein, supra note 137, at 810; Comment, The Duty to Disclose, supra note 137,
at 331-33; Note, The Attorney's Duty, supra note 137, at 291-92.
140. See T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 136-37 (1978) (disclosure of
damaging adverse authority "not done very often"); Broshnahan & Broshnahan, The Attor-
ney's Ethical Conduct During Adversary Proceedings, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY: A
GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 143, 164 (1978) ("There may be no more neglected or widely ignored
ethical obligation in the Code of Professional Responsibility than that requiring an attorney to
share his knowledge of the law with the court and his opponent."); Smith & Metzloff, supra
note 137, at 849 ("Most practitioners have cited material under the existing rule infre-
quently."); Turnstall, supra note 137, at 5 ("1 doubt whether there is a day in the year, or a
court in the country, in which this ruling [Opinion 146 of the ABA] is not habitually vio-
lated."); Comment, The Duty to Disclose, supra note 137, at 336-67 ("At this time most law-
yers do not volunteer adverse decisions to the court, and most attorneys would not feel that
they should, except, perhaps, in the one case out of a thousand where the facts, and the law,
and the jurisdiction are absolutely in point."). Of course, the fact that other attorneys disre-
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Professional Ethics and Grievances ruled that an attorney must advise the
court of adverse decisions of which the attorney is aware and opposing coun-
sel is not.14 ' The attorney may, of course, challenge the decision's sound-
ness. 142 The opinion left many questions unanswered, such as: (1) what
level of court decisions must be reported-appellate or trial decisions? (2)
from what jurisdiction? (3) how adverse must the case be-i.e., how closely
on point?
Opinion 146 prompted much soul-searching in the legal community. A
1949 American Bar Association Journal article 43 directly challenged the
opinion's logic and precedential undergirding. 44 The article focused on the
attorney's role as an advocate, rather than as an umpire.' 4 5 Additionally,
the article proposed narrowing the duty of disclosure to controlling deci-
sions. The author did not, however, clearly define the term "controlling
decision." 46
Shortly thereafter, the ABA Committee reconsidered Opinion 146. In
Opinion 280, the Committee reaffirmed the central holding of Opinion 146
and rejected any limitation to controlling authorities. 14 7 The Committee
limited the obligation to directly adverse cases and significantly clarified
Opinion 146.148 The Committee further observed that when attorneys can
find no local law, doubts should be resolved in favor of disclosure of out-of-
state cases. The Committee noted that a proper determination of whether
the attorney should disclose the precedent requires consideration of three
gard a particular ethical rule does not sanction an attorney's disregard. In re Wetzel, 143 Ariz.
35, 691 P.2d 1063, 1072-73 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213 (1985); In re Information, 351
11. 206, 184 N.E. 332, 340 (1933); An Attorney v. State Bar Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss.
1985); In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 194 A.2d 236, 242 (1963); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97
A.2d 621, 630 (1953); In re Meck, 51 Ohio App. 237, 200 N.E. 478, 480 (1935); OKLA. B.A.,
Op. 23 (1932), digested in 0. MARU & R. CLOUGH, supra note 37, 3626.
141. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances Formal Op. 146 (1935) [hereinaf-
ter ABA Formal Op. 146]. The Committee was construing Canon 22 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, which did not specifically address the point. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12,
§ 12.8, at n.97.
142. ABA Formal Op. 146, supra note 141.
143. Turnstall, supra note 137, at 5.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 6.
146. Id. at 7. In discussing the applicability of the British precedents, Turnstall pointed
out the unitary feature of the British judicial system, as distinguished from the American dual
federal-state system. He was unclear as to whether he viewed the federal court system as one
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the article did not resolve the issue of whether "controlling authori-
ties" included lower court cases of the particular jurisdiction, or just decisions of the jurisdic-
tion's court of last resort. Turnstall's argument was explicitly rejected in the influential New
Jersey Supreme Court decision of In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46, 48-49 (1954).
147. We would not confine the Opinion to "controlling authorities"-i.e., those de-
cisive of the pending case-but, in accordance with the tests hereafter suggested,
would apply it to a decision directly adverse to any proposition of law on which
the lawyer expressly relies, which would reasonably be considered important by
the judge sitting on the case.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 280 (1949) [hereinafter ABA
Formal Op. 280].
148. Opinion 146 (ABA Formal Op. 146, supra note 141) was ambiguous on this point.
ABA Formal Opinion 280 analyzed Opinion 146 and concluded that the intention was to limit
the disclosure obligation to "directly adverse" decisions.
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questions: (1) whether the overlooked decision is one that the court clearly
should take into account in deciding the case; (2) whether in failing to dis-
close the decision the lawyer, in the eyes of a judge, would lack candor and
would be viewed as acting unfairly to the court; and (3) whether the judge
could consider himself or herself misled by the lawyer. 149
Opinion 280 did not, however, directly address the issues of jurisdiction
and court level. Opinion 280's broad disclosure requirement led to criticism,
and the Model Code, adopted in 1970, significantly curtailed the disclosure
obligation.150 Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B) required a lawyer to disclose to
the court only: "(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
him to be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not dis-
closed by opposing counsel."' 5'1 No requirement to disclose cases from
outside the controlling jurisdiction remained. 152 This duty, although less
149. ABA Formal Op. 280, supra note 147, at 260.
150. Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, DUKE L.J. 921, 939 (1978).
151. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B) (1980); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1980) (discussing importance of
tribunal being fully informed if it is to make a fair decision):
The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully in-
formed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A
tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair
and accurate determination of the matter before it. The adversary system con-
templates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light
most favorable to his client. Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction directly adverse to the position of his client, he should
inform the tribunal of its existence unless his adversary has done so; but, having
made such disclosure, he may challenge its soundness in whole or in part.
152. Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REV. 833, 835 (1982);
Pye, supra note 150, at 939; Uviller, supra note 8, at 734-35. But see Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1980), remanded for further consideration sub nom.
Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983) (critizing counsel for
citing only the one stray case supporting their position while not disclosing the four federal
and four state cases to the contrary). In Stoddard none of the cases were from the controlling
jurisdiction. The court recognized that counsel's action did not violate the letter of the Model
Code, but was of the view that the Model Code's spirit was violated. In citing the one outside
case counsel made an implied representation, the court felt, that the counsel knew of no ad-
verse authority. The court cited ABA Formal Opinion 280 for its conclusion. Id. at 325 n.3.
In Estate of Oskey v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (D. Minn. 1988), the court found
that the counsel for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had breached his obligation to the
court by not disclosing the one case on point, a case from Colorado in which current counsel
had also represented the IRS. The court did not inquire as to whether that obligation was
limited to cases from the controlling jurisdiction and what the controlling jurisdiction in fed-
eral tax cases should include. It may well be that as the cases evolve, courts will impose a
broader disclosure obligation on attorneys representing governmental agencies that are fre-
quently in court and which thus create and have access to a substantial amount of unpublished
case law. See Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Govern-
ment Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeal, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 946-55 (1989)
(concluding access to unpublished opinions significant government advantage); Weinstein,
supra note 137, at 810 (government attorney's special position makes duty to disclose quite
clear). The alternative to invoking a higher professional standard for government lawyers
could be to use the Freedom of Information Act to obtain unpublished decisions involving the
government. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 57 U.S.L.W. 4925, 4930 (U.S.
June 23, 1989) (tax publisher entitled to use Freedom of Information Act to obtain all district
court tax opinions received by Justice Department). Of course, should the court inquire of
adverse authority outside the controlling jurisdiction, the attorney then has an obligation to
reveal those adverse decisions known to him. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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onerous, required the attorney to disclose authority that might greatly dam-
age a client's case. 153 The rule also clarified that the obligation extended to
all legal authority, not just to decisions of the jurisdiction's highest court.
After some initial attempts to broaden the disclosure rule,154 the drafters
of the Model Rules elected to abide by the standards set forth in DR 7-
106(B)(1). 155 Thus, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) requires the attorney to disclose
"legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel."' 5 6 A recent informal ABA opinion' 57 interpreted the disclosure
obligation of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3). A trial court had decided an issue of
first impression in the state in favor of the plaintiffs. Subsequent to that
decision, and while the litigation was still pending, an intermediate appellate
court of that state handed down a decision on the issue of first impression.
The appellate decision could be reached two ways, one of which was in di-
rect contradiction to the trial court's action. The appellate court did not
have direct jurisdiction over the trial court, but its decisions were controlling
until the trial court's own intermediate appellate court ruled on the issue.
The plaintiffs' counsel learned of the decision and inquired of the Committee
whether he could wait until (1) the appellate process had concluded in the
other case (i.e., until discretionary review was either granted or denied by
the state supreme court) or (2) the defendant's attorney revived the issue.
The Committee, after reviewing its earlier Formal Opinions 146 and 280,
concluded that the attorney had to disclose the new decision to the trial
court; he could not wait until the other case was concluded. The attorney's
obligation of candor to the court and the interests of fair administration of
justice required prompt notification. After disclosure to the trial court, the
plaintiffs' attorney might attack the soundness of the intermediate appellate
Rule 3.3(a)(i) (1983) (requiring attorney not knowingly to make false statement of fact or law);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980); see I G. HAZARD
& W. HODES, supra note 17, at 362; cf Scarborough Constructors, Inc. v. Pace Constr. Corp.,
685 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (local court rule requiring disclosure of similar cases
pending before any other court (emphasis in original)).
153. But see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8 (challenging merit of rationale for disclo-
sure rule).
154. A draft proposal would have required disclosure of any authority "that would proba-
bly have a substantial effect on the determination of a material issue." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1(c) (Discussion Draft 1980). There is some disagreement
over the significance of the wording of the draft proposal. Compare Hazard, supra note 137, at
827 ("only a small difference was involved") with Freedman, supra note 137, at 837 ("proposed
model rule 3.1(c) might indeed have imposed a new burden on the advocate") and C. WOLF-
RAM, supra note 12, § 12.8, at n.97 (draft would go further than Model Code of Professional
Responsibility). Both Freedman and Hazard agree that the draft proposal would have, at a
minimum, required disclosure of some cases from outside the controlling jurisdiction. The
proposed draft rule met stiff opposition. See, e.g., Elliot, The Proposed Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct: Invention Not Mothered by Necessity?, 54 CONN. B.J. 265 (1980); Koskoff,
Proposed New Code of Professional Responsibility 1984 is Now!, 54 CONN. B.J. 260 (1980).
155. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 210 (1984) ("Paragraph
(a)(3) is substantially identical to DR 7-106(B)(1)."); see I G. HAZARD & W. HoDES, supra
note 17, at 352; R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 3.9; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8; Hazard,
supra note 137, at 826.
156. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
157. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1505 (1984).
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court decision in order to distinguish the case or to construe the case as not
in conflict with the trial court decision. 1
58
The notion that the purpose of litigation is to promote justice and truth is
the philosophical underpinning of the duty to disclose adverse precedent.
Other basic concepts hold that litigation is not a game, and that justice is
promoted by an obligation to provide the court with all pertinent author-
ity.' 59 In appellate practice, the harm caused by a misinformed court can
extend beyond the parties. The precedent may affect the disposition of other
cases. Many legal scholars, however, object to the disclosure rule on the
grounds that it compromises the attorney's duty to a client.
160
The current Model Rule, moreover, contains numerous ambiguities.
16 1
Principal among these are the compass of "directly adverse" decisions and
the definition of "controlling jurisdiction." Some authorities have opined
that the directly adverse formulation basically reduces the disclosure obliga-
tion to nothing.16 2 This author disagrees. Although narrow, the rule's dis-
closure obligation does have substantive meaning. The pain caused by
disclosure of the case provides a useful measure of guidance. The more pain-
ful the disclosure, the more likely the case falls within the disclosure eth-
ics.163 A decision that can be reasonably construed as directly adverse falls
within the disclosure rule.164
158. See also Seidman v. American Express Co., 523 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (defendant's counsel unsuccessful in distinguishing adverse authority directly conflicting
with his oral argument). Contrast the textual fact situation with Pesta v. CBS, Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 166, 168 (E.D. Mich. 1988), where the federal court granted summary judgment to
defendants in a libel case concerning statements a broadcaster made about a hospital's care.
One month later, the Michigan Supreme Court changed the controlling law. Id. The defend-
ants were found to not have an obligation to disclose the Michigan decision to the federal
court. Id. at 171.
159. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983); 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES,
supra note 17, at 352-53; Aronson, supra note 3, at 864; 1 Thode, supra note 137, at 585-86.
Professor Gaetke employs this rationale to urge convincingly a broadening of the disclosure
obligation to "when a reasonable lawyer would know that the court should consider the legal
authority in making its decision." Gaetke, supra note 45, at 88.
160. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8 (disclosure rule would frustrate
attorney duty to represent client zealously); Freedman, supra note 137, at 833 (adversary sys-
tem functions well by encourgaging each side to seek out materials favorable to own side);
Comment, The Duty To Disclose, supra note 137, at 331 (disclosure rule would infringe upon
attorney's loyalty to client). But see Weinstein, supra note 137, at 807 (favoring duty to
disclose).
161. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8 (listing as interpretive issues "con-
trolling jurisdiction," appropriate time for disclosure, and meaning of "directly adverse");
Freedman, supra note 137, at 833 (under current rule not necessary to show knowledge au-
thority directly adverse).
162. See Gaetke, supra note 84, at 57 (impact significantly less severe as result of directly
adverse and controlling jurisdiction limitations); Uviller, supra note 8, at 835 (disclosure rule
"so narrow as to be wholly ineffectual").
163. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 353 (recognizing directly adverse limi-
tation caused some problems of interpretation, but arguing for interpretation that protects the
court and does not trivialize the rule). Thus, under their view, "the more unhappy a lawyer is
that he found an adverse precedent, the clearer it is that he must reveal it." Id. at 353.
164. ABA Formal Op. 280, supra note 147; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984).
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Brief analyses of hypothetical scenarios illustrate not only the complexity
of the disclosure obligation in the context of the "controlling jurisdiction"
limitation 165 but also the almost theological hairsplitting that may be in-
volved in analyzing the rule. This author arbitrarily selected Oklahoma as
the illustrative jurisdiction, although many of the following hypotheticals are
relevant to all jurisdicitons.
1. An Oklahoma court of appeals decision directly adverse to the position
you are taking on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, where Oklahoma substantive
law governs: Both the Model Code and the Model Rules clearly require
disclosure; both ethical directives reject limitations to controlling deci-
sions. 166 Under Oklahoma law, court of appeals decisions do not bind as
precedent unless approved for publication by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. 67 Unapproved decisions therefore do not bind federal courts con-
struing Oklahoma law.16 8 Erie principles, however, suggest that intermedi-
ate court decisions, in the absence of state supreme court decisions are and
should normally be followed. 1
69
2. A Tenth Circuit decision construing Oklahoma law directly adverse to a
position you are taking on appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: 170 Gen-
erally, federal cases construing state law are persuasive, but not binding, on
the state court.' 17 In view of the federal court's role under Erie as a proxy
for the state court system, 172 or as a trial or an intermediate appellate
court,173 the better approach would consider federal court decisions constru-
165. But see I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 353 (defining controlling juris-
diction normally to mean "the same state as the pending case for state law issues, and the same
District or Circuit for federal law issues, and, of course, applicable United States Supreme
Court decisions in either event"). The authors do not explain why a United States Supreme
Court opinion on an issue of state law should be treated as part of the controlling jurisdiction.
166. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983). But see Uviller, supra note 8, at 734 (in-
terpreting Model Code to be limited to decisions " 'controlling' on the court to which the
argument is addressed").
167. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.5 (1981).
168. Russell v. Atlas Van Lines, 411 F. Supp. 111, 113 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
169. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940); West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940); Hill v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817,
827 (10th Cir. 1986); Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 525-26 (10th Cir. 1986); IA
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE pt. 2, 0.307 (2d ed. 1989); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (1982); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 210
(1965). But see Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27, 30-31 (1935) (federal court correct
in disregarding Illinois intermediate appellate decision where Illinois statute deprives such de-
cision of binding authority).
170. Although the federal case will most often arise in diversity situations, some federal
question cases will also involve the application of governing state law. See, e.g., Commissioner
v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967) (character of property for federal estate tax pur-
poses); Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 784 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir.) (state claim brought under
federal court's pendent jurisdiction), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 169, § 4515; Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (1980).
171. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 225 (1965); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 205 (1940).
172. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 169, § 4507.
173. Rhymes v. Branick Mfg. Corp., 629 F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir. 1980); Farmer v. Travel-
ers Indem. Co., 539 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1976).
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ing the applicable state law as within the controlling jurisdiction.174 Fur-
thermore, attorneys should attempt to avoid accidental conflicting
interpretations of Oklahoma law. Since the Tenth Circuit includes
Oklahoma, and since federal appeals from Oklahoma federal district courts
will be heard there, a requirement for disclosure of adverse Tenth Circuit
authority will promote studied interpretations of Oklahoma law. 175
3. An Oklahoma Supreme Court decision directly adverse to a position you
are advocating in the Tenth Circuit; the appeal involves issues in which
Oklahoma substantive law provides the rule of decision: Clearly, under the
applicable ethical directive, this situation presents the most compelling is-
sues.' 7 6 A decision by the state supreme court on an issue of state law binds
the federal court.177
4. A Fifth Circuit decision construing federal law directly adverse to a po-
sition you are advancing in the Tenth Circuit: A Fifth Circuit precedent
construing federal law does not bind the Tenth Circuit.178 Unless one views
the federal system as one jurisdiction, a decision by one circuit should not
trigger the disclosure obligation.
5. An Oklahoma state trial court decision directly adverse to a position
you are advancing in the Tenth Circuit, where Oklahoma substantive law
provides the rule of decision: Governing ethical standards require disclo-
sure, particularly when no other applicable Oklahoma law exists. The perti-
nent legal authority arises in the controlling jurisdiction. The federal court
174. As the Supreme Court once observed, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a federal
court is, "in effect, only another court of the State." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
108 (1945); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947). But see Stewart v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 857 (Okla. 1979) ("Whitaker, a federal case, lacks the force of
'authority' in that it cannot bind this court").
175. The Second Circuit expanded on the point. In Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
652 F.2d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 198 1), the court faced an unresolved issue of Tennessee law: Does
the right of publicity (the exclusive ownership of all rights to the commercial use of a person's
name) survive the death of the subject? The existing authority was a Sixth Circuit opinion,
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1978), revg 441 F. Supp.
1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). The Sixth Circuit had concluded that the right of publicity did not
survive under Tennessee law. The majority accepted the Sixth Circuit's opinion as authorita-
tive and refused to examine the issue independently. 652 F.2d at 283. Judge Mansfield dis-
sented, maintaining that the Second Circuit was in as good a position as the Sixth Circuit to
predict the future course of Tennessee law. Id. at 284. He would have found the right to
survive. Ironically, future events in Tennessee vindicated him. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial
Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding right of publicity sur-
vives death of subject). See generally Gibbs, How Does the Federal Judge Determine What is
the Law of the State, 17 S.C.L. REV. 487 (1965) (discussing choice of law problems after Erie).
176. Indeed, even under the more limited disclosure rule advocated by Turnstall, supra
note 137, this decision would have to be disclosed. See supra text accompanying notes 143-
146.
177. Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 169, § 4507; MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 169, 0.307[2].
178. Compare In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and
Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE
L.J. 677, 721 (1984) (discussing choice of law in cases where venue transferred) with Factors,
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1981)(finding Sixth Circuit construction
of Tennessee law authoritative).
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would consider such authority in the determination of state law issues. 179
The federal court would assign weight to the state trial court decision based
on the weight state trial court decisions are accorded in Oklahoma. 180
6. A Kansas Supreme Court case construing Oklahoma law in a way di-
rectly adverse to the position you are advancing in the Oklahoma Supreme
Court: Only a very broad definition of "controlling jurisdiction," that is, all
cases construing the governing law, would require disclosure. 181
7. A Kansas Supreme Court case construing Kansas statutory law, from
which the applicable Oklahoma Law was derived, in a manner directly ad-
verse to the position you are advancing in the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
Although somewhat incongruous, the disclosure obligation in this instance is
probably greater than when the Kansas court construes Oklahoma law.
Oklahoma accords Kansas decisions construing the Kansas statutes from
which early Oklahoma statutes were taken "well-nigh conclusive" effect. 18 2
Oklahoma's deference appears to be a variant of the well-established rule
that decisions construing a statute prior to the time another state adopts the
statute are particularly persuasive. 18 3
8. An unpublished decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court directly ad-
verse to your position on appeal to the Tenth Circuit in a case where
Oklahoma substantive law provides the rule of decision: Oklahoma court
rules do not allow citation of such a decision as precedent in an Oklahoma
court. ' 84 No obligation to disclose the case to the federal court should exist.
The federal court simply must give the state court decision the same effect as
would a state court.185 Just as the Oklahoma court rules would not have
permitted the case to be cited as precedent in the state court, it need not be
disclosed to the federal court. The opposing view distinguishes between
legal authority and controlling authority. The intent of the Oklahoma rule,
however, suggests that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma only wants to see
179. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1967); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d
1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1974); Gustin v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 154 F.2d 961, 962-63 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946).
180. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 169, 0.307[2]; 32 AM. JUR. 2D, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 298 (1965).
181. The case did not arise in Oklahoma, and no disclosure would be required under the
view espoused by Hazard and Hodes. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 353.
182. Haws v. Luethje, 503 P.2d 871, 876-77 (Okla. 1972); Chesmore v. Chesmore, 484 P.2d
516, 518 (Okla. 1971).
183. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52.02 (Sands
rev. 4th ed. 1984); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 204 (1965); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 205 (1940). One
area of widespread application concerns the attorney's obligation to disclose federal cases con-
struing federal procedural rules, from which the state law or rule in question was derived,
adversely to the position the attorney is advocating. Thirty-two states, for example, have
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, EVIDENCE T-1
(1988 Supp.). Should the attorney be required to divulge adverse federal authority from cir-
cuits or districts not within Hazard's & Hodes' definition of "controlling jurisdiction"? What
if the state supreme court had stated that federal decisions are presumed to be applicable,
under the rationale set forth in Sutherland's book?
184. OKLA. R. Civ. APP. P. 1.2000(B)(E).
185. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 169, § 4507.
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such unpublished cases cited where res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of
the case is involved. The Tenth Circuit has a similar but stronger rule.18 6
9. A Tenth Circuit decision on federal constitutional law directly adverse
to a position you are advancing in the Oklahoma Supreme Court: The
Oklahoma Supreme Court finds lower federal court decisions construing fed-
eral law persuasive but not binding. 187 The prevention of accidental conflict
within the State of Oklahoma on issues of federal law is one basis for requir-
ing disclosure of the Tenth Circuit precedent in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, however, need not give any more deference to a decision of
the Tenth Circuit on a federal issue than to a decision of the Sixth Circuit on
the same issue. Attorneys should follow the policy of disclosure in this in-
stance in order to avoid accidental conflicts within the jurisdiction.
10. A New York decision construing a matter of New York law in a man-
ner directly adverse to a position you are advancing in the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, where New York substantive law will provide the rule of
decision: Prevailing policy requires that disclosure be made. The control-
ling jurisdiction in this case is not Oklahoma but New York. New York
cases would therefore carry authoritative weight.18 8
11. A United States Supreme Court decision directly adverse to your posi-
tion on a federal issue on appeal in the Oklahoma Supreme Court: The rule
that applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing fed-
eral law bind the Oklahoma Supreme Court' 89 mandates disclosure. 190
12. Appellee, on appeal, has failed to find a line of reasoning which would
support affirmation of the district court: No rule requires disclosure. 19'
186. See 10TH CIR. R. 36.3; cf United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 524
(E.D. Cal. 1975) (citing unpublished decision, while not necessarily misconduct, was im-
proper); Jones v. Commonwealth, 593 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (improper proce-
dure to cite unpublished decision in violation of appellate rule); ARIZ. B.A., Op. 87-14 (1987),
extracted in ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 901:1406 (1980)
(cannot cite memorandum opinion in violation of court rule). Compare ABA Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics, Informal Op. C-667 (1963), reprinted in I INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 249-
50 (1975) (proper to cite unreported decision if no contrary court rule). Lower courts are also
bound by a higher court's noncitation policy. Robinson v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 600, 600 (10th
Cir. 1989).
187. Dority v. Green Country Castings Corp., 727 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Okla. 1986); Phillips
v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okla. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1989); 20 AM. JUR.
2D Courts § 230 (1965); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 206 (1940).
188. See Annotation, Duty of Courts of Following Decisions of Other States on Questions of
Common Law or Unwritten Law, in which the Cause of Action Has Its Situs, 78 A.L.R. 897
(1931); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 206 (1965); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 204b (1940); see also Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, writ ref'd n.r.e)
(Texas court applying New York law).
189. Bailess v. Paukune, 208 Okla. 146, 254 P.2d 349, 351 (1953); Skelly Oil Co. v. Jack-
son, 194 Okla. 183, 148 P.2d 182, 185 (1944); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts §§ 226-29 (1965); 21
C.J.S. Courts § 206 (1940).
190. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 353.
191. ABA Formal Op. 280, supra note 147; Broshnahan & Broshnahan, supra note 140, at
165. Haines, Problems of Legal Ethics, 35 CANADIAN B. REV. 247, 277-78 (1957); Thode,
supra note 137, at 586. Other scenarios are possible. What about disclosing an adverse
Oklahoma Supreme Court decision construing federal law to a panel of Tenth Circuit judges?
See Bryant v. Civiletti, 663 F.2d 286, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (federal circuit not bound by state
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Perhaps because of these ambiguities and interpretational difficulties,
courts rarely decide cases on the failure of counsel to disclose adverse prece-
dent.192 In Jorgensen v. Volusia, 193 perhaps the best recent case, the lower
court sanctioned the appellants for failure to cite controlling precedent in the
federal district court. Appellants had requested a temporary restraining or-
der and preliminary injunction. The dispute centered on the validity of a
county ordinance that prohibited nude or semi-nude dancing in establish-
ments selling alcoholic beverages. One of the critical issues concerned
whether the state had delegated to the county its powers to regulate the sale
and consumption of alcohol under the twenty-first amendment. Delegation
would have given the ordinance a presumption of constitutional validity.
Without delegation, a stricter standard based on the general power would
have governed the ordinance. At the lower court appellants failed to cite the
Florida Supreme Court's decision holding that the powers had been dele-
gated, despite the fact that one of appellants participated in that case. The
district court awarded sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
and the court of appeals affirmed.' 94
court interpretation of federal law); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.
Utah 198 1) (federal circuit not bound by state court interpretation of federal law). Disclosure
should probably be required, to avoid conflicting interpretations of federal law within the cir-
cuit or in Oklahoma. An Oklahoma decision, however, would probably not be required to be
disclosed to a panel of the Sixth Circuit, as Oklahoma is not one of the states comprising the
Sixth Circuit.
192. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8; Freedman, supra note 137, at 837.
193. 846 F.2d 1350, 1351 (1 1th Cir. 1988), aff'g 625 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
194. The appellants purported to describe the law to the district court in the hope
that the description would guide and inform the court's decision. With appar-
ently studied care, however, they withheld the fact that the long-awaited deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Florida had been handed down. This will not do.
The appellants are not redeemed by the fact that opposing counsel subsequently
cited the controlling precedent. The appellants had a duty to refrain from af-
firmatively misleading the court as to the state of the law. They were not re-
lieved of this duty by the possibility that opposing counsel might find and cite
the controlling precedent, particularly where, as here, a temporary restraining
order might have been issued ex parte.
846 F.2d at 1352 (emphasis in original); see also Blinderman Constr. Co. v. United States, 15
Ct. Cl. 121, 123 (1988) (defendant obligated to disclose to Court of Claims controlling adverse
precedent from Federal Circuit); White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1989) (ad-
monishing attorney for not citing to Fifth Circuit its own controlling precendent on irreparable
harm requirement for civil rights injunction; court noting admonished attorney also counsel in
earlier case); Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir.
1983) (failure to cite adverse decision contrary to MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 7-106(B)(l) (1980)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984); United States v. Burnette-
Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 589 n.4 (6th Cir. 1978) (attorney's duty to cite adverse decision;
otherwise violate Model Code DR 7-106(B)(1); Katris v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
562 F.2d 866, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1977) (sanctioning attorney for failing to apprise appellate court
of directly controlling authority); Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 671 F. Supp.
1021, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (counsel had duty to bring to court's attention three cases that had
rejected identical argument and in which counsel was personally involved); Braun v. Harris,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 17,070 (E.D. Wis. July 7, 1980)
(court requires explanation from Department of Health, Education and Welfare why two con-
trolling decisions were not discussed in department's briefs, suggesting that government law-
yers have a greater duty in this respect than private attorneys); Shaeffer v. State Bar, 26 Cal.
2d 739, 160 P.2d 825, 829 (1945) (concluding attorney should have cited adverse decision to
court and then attempted to distinguish it); Newberger v. Newberger, 311 So. 2d 176, 176 (Fla.
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A duty exists not only to disclose directly "adverse" decisions in the con-
trolling jurisdiction, but also to disclose the actual precedential validity of
the cases the attorney cites to the court. In Croy v. Skinner 195 the court
noted the attorney's obligation to inform the court of any history subsequent
to a case's citation to the court that affects the validity of that citation. 196 In
Skinner one party cited a federal district court decision from another district
that had subsequently been vacated seven months prior to the filing of the
brief in which the citation was given. Giving the attorney the benefit of the
doubt, the court observed that the attorney should have filed a supplemental
brief notifying the court of the subsequent history of the cited case. 197
Although theoretically challenging, the disclosure duty in most instances
simply parallels prudent appellate practice. Most often, the prudent attor-
ney will assume that the court will find the adverse decision on its own or
that opposing counsel will belatedly discover the precedent and file a supple-
mental brief. The attorney thus should distinguish the case or attack its
reasoning. 198 The course of disclosure installs confidence in the court of the
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (responsibility of counsel to fully inform court on applicable law; citing
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1980)); Cicio v. New York, 98
A.D.2d 38, 469 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (1983) (city's lawyer failed to cite authorities directly ad-
verse to city's position, although city unsuccessful party in two of these precedents). And see
In re Universal Minerals, Inc., 755 F.2d 309, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1985) (dictum obligating counsel
to make court aware of recently announced law, even if unfavorable, citing MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983)); Plambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1131 n.44
(1 th Cir. 1985) (court, in dictum, observing counsel apparently violated both Model Rule 3.3
and Model Code DR 7-106(B)(1) by not advising lower court in related cause of action, of
holdings by federal district court and Ninth Circuit adverse to his position on virtually identi-
cal claims), rehg denied, 763 F.2d 419 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1169 (1986); In re
Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 637, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (in passing, court notes counsel's lack of
candor in failing to disclose pertinent United States Supreme Court decisions, citing both
Model Code and Model Rule disclosure provisions); Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102
N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156, 163 (Ct. App. 1985) (counsel failed to cite adverse decision); Ryan
Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Lehmann, 544 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976,
writ dism'd) (inexcusable for counsel not to bring to court's attention case in which attorney
was counsel). In Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir.
1986), rev'g 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of rule 11 as a
sanctioning measure for an attorney's failure to disclose adverse authority. Id. at 1541. The
court refused to permit rule I I to be erected as an additional standard for ethical conduct:
"We must not interpret Rule II to create two ladders for after-the-fact review of asserted
unethical conduct: one consisting of sanction procedures, the other consisting of the well-
established bar and court ethical procedures." Id. at 1542.
195. 410 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
196. Id. at 128.
197. Id. at 125 n.7. For similar fact situations, see Hampton v. Long, 686 F. Supp. 1202,
1205-06 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (admonishing attorney for not bringing to court's attention that
principal case relied upon by attorney had been later reversed); Cimino v. Yale University, 638
F. Supp. 952, 959 n.7 (D. Conn. 1986) (court, finding case relied upon overruled, yet that fact
not brought to court's attention, held "diligent research, which includes Shepardizing cases, is
a professional responsibility"); Clayton v. City of Cape Canaveral, 354 So. 2d 147, 150 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (attorneys have ethical obligation to be certain that cases cited to the
court have not been later overruled); In re Attorney, 10 A.D. 491, 42 N.Y.S. 268, 270 (1896)
(suspending attorney for two years, in part for failing to inform lower court of adverse unpub-
lished decisions known to him that cast substantial doubt on the reported case attorney was
advancing as controlling).
198. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 17, at 353; R. LYNN, supra note 8, § 3.9;
Freedman, supra note 137, at 838; Hazard, supra note 137, at 825; Weinstein, supra note 137,
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thoroughness and integrity of counsel's efforts. 199 Wolfram stated the dan-
ger of failing to disclose an adverse precedent: "If nothing else, a court's late
discovery that an advocate has failed to confront an adverse authority is
likely to produce the impression that the awakened precedent, because sup-
pressed, should be regarded as particularly vicious.' 12 °
D. Candor's Limitations
Candor does have its limitations. Courts tolerate relevant criticisms of
their opinions. 20 ' Attorneys must, however, uphold their professional obli-
gation to be circumspect when requesting rehearing or reconsideration con-
cerning either the attorney's emotional feelings about the decision or the
attorney's opinion of the members of the court.20 2 The same reservation
at 810-11, 813. In United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 450 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 n.6
(N.D. Cal. 1978), the court observed "it is surely an important element of responsible advo-
cacy . . . for a lawyer to give the Court the benefit of his considered judgment as to why
apparently controlling authority is inapplicable." See also Reaves, Lawscope: Misleading
Briefs, 70 A.B.A. J. 41 (1984) (New York City Appellate Court Division rebukes attorneys for
filing incomplete briefs).
199. T. MARVELL, supra note 140, at 137; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8, at 682;
Weinstein, supra note 137, at 811.
200. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, § 12.8.
201. See. e.g., Phipps v. Medford, 81 Or. 119, 158 P. 666 (1916) ("Any court worthy of the
name will respect such conduct [vigorous presentation of attorney's views] although it may not
concur with the argument."). But cf Rahles v. J. Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co., 137 Wis. 506,
119 N.W. 289 (1909) (court not tolerant of rehearing petition scolding court for its earlier
opinion).
202. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 217, 219 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Flaum, J. concurring) (statement in petition for rehearing that majority drafter
seized opportunity to preempt United States Supreme Court and emasculate the Court's rul-
ings, went beyond the bounds of acceptable appellate practice); In re Hartford Textbook
Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 302 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981) (attorney observing court had made "so many
stupid errors," as constituting "[tihe emasculation of the integrity of the Court and the way it
prostitutes the administration [of] justice"); Vandenbergehe v. Poole, 163 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (petition for rehearing stricken as insulting members of the court); In re
Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1976) (attorney who charged Iowa Supreme Court on
rehearing with willfully avoiding constitutional issue raised by attorney admonished by the
court); In re Woolley, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 95, 102 (1875) (attorney fined for filing brief charging
court with carelessness and with overlooking the facts in the case, for creating facts and ignor-
ing others, and for being indifferent to harm caused attorney's client); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Spencer, 258 La. 10, 245 So. 2d 374, 379 (1971) (attorney reprimanded for accusing
the Supreme Court of attempting to protect the lower court judge and of being dishonest in
denying appellant relief requested); In re Dunn, 85 Neb. 606, 124 N.W. 120, 122 (1909) (attor-
ney suspended indefinitely for filing fifty-page rehearing brief principally attacking intelligence
and integrity of judge who authored the court's opinion); In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 414 P.2d
862, 865 (1966) (attorney claimed "legal chicanery" of New Mexico appellate court in petition
for certiorari filed in United States Supreme Court, reprimanded), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 449
(1967); In re Robinson, 48 Wash. 153, 92 P. 929, 931 (1907) (suspending attorney six months
for implying in petition for rehearing political cronyism and personal advantage motives for
majority); In re Lambuth, 18 Wash. 478, 51 P. 1071, 1071 (1898) (statement in petition for
rehearing that majority decision could not be more prejudiced or biased "if the court had been
under hypnotic suggestion" objectionable, but since attorney withdrew offending language, no
sanction); Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 150 N.W. 1101, 1102 (1915) (state-
ments by winning party's attorney in his brief in opposition to petition for rehearing that
equity courts rejoice in finding new ways to destroy rights not favored by court merited sanc-
tion of denial of costs and fees on rehearing petition's denial).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
applies to characterizations of, or comments regarding, the lower court. 20 3
As one judge observed, "[y]ou can think it, but you better not say it.''2°4
Although the first amendment implies that attorneys have some leeway, 20 5
courts will sanction attorneys who have gone beyond the particular court's
conception of appropriate conduct. 20 6
203. Kelly v. Boettcher, 82 F. 794, 795 (8th Cir. 1897) (ordering brief stricken and author
removed from case where brief attacked intelligence, integrity, and character of judges below),
further hearing below sub noma. United States v. Greer, 85 F. 857, 859 (C.C.D. Colo. 1898)
(attorney disbarred for such brief); Gregoire v. National Bank, 413 P.2d 27, 37 (Alaska 1966)
(attorney reprimanded for accusing trial court of condoning and encouraging alleged unethical
conduct of other party and with taking actions designed to avoid a trial on the merits); Wil-
burn v. Reitman, 54 Ariz. 31, 91 P.2d 865, 867 (1939) (attorney reprimanded for villifying trial
court and opposing counsel in appellate briefs); Ramirez v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 2d 402, 619 P.2d
399, 406 (1980) (attorney suspended for one year for alleging in Ninth Circuit briefs thatjustices of California Court of Appeals for Third District acted unlawfully and illegally and
had become parties to theft of property belonging to attorney's clients); Sonksen v. Legal Serv.
Corp., 389 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Iowa 1986) (attorney censored for abusive comments on appeal
concerning trial court, opposing lawyers, and their clients); In re Estes, 355 Mich. 411, 94
N.W.2d 916, 919 (1959) (attorney suspended for one year for accusing trial court in his appel-
late briefs of collaboration with opposing party, with overreaching his authority, and for chal-
lenging the trial court's integrity); In re Glauberman, 17 N.J. Eq. 384, 152 A. 650, 651 (1930)
(accusation in brief that trial court acted as opposing counsel along with other statements
warranted striking of brief from record, $250 fine, and suspension for one year from appearing
in appellate court); In re Rockmole, 127 A.D. 499, 111 N.Y.S. 879, 881 (1908) (suspending
attorney six months for filing affidavit on appeal reflecting upon character of municipal courtjustice); Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dale, 361 N.W.2d 275, 279 (S.D. 1985) (attor-
ney rebuked for claiming on appeal "[t]he (trial) Court had become obviously more than a
judicial body. It had become an advocate for (the) PCA."); Farmer v. Board of Professional
Responsibility, 660 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tenn.) (attorney suspended for alleging in briefs seeking
review of court of appeals decision in Tennessee Supreme Court that court of appeals made
"intentionally false finding" and that the case was lies, including lies of the court of appeals)
(emphasis in original), appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 946 (1983); Ward v. University of the S., 209
Tenn. 412, 354 S.W.2d 246, 248 (1962) (attorney's suggestion that evidence "gives the lie" to
the trial court's conclusion considered flagrant violation of rules of professional conduct). And
see In re Minnis, 56 S. Ct. 504 (1936) (attorney who acknowledges his mistake in filing brief
disparaging state supreme court justices not disbarred, but offensive statements in briefs or-
dered stricken from files); State v. Rhodes, 177 Neb. 650, 131 N.W.2d 118, 120 (1964) (refer-
ence to district court as a Kangaroo court in attorney's answer filed in disciplinary proceeding
violates Canons of Professional Ethics).
204. Vandenberghe v. Poole, 163 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (Rawls, J., con-
curring). In Vandenberghe the petition for rehearing accused the appellate court of either
ignoring the law or being "not interested in determining the law." Id. at 51. The same maxim
should also be applied to comments concerning opposing counsel or parties. In re Philbrook,
105 Cal. 471, 38 P. 884, 885 (1895); Meeker v. Walraven, 72 N.M. 107, 380 P.2d 845, 848
(1963); Youngentob v. Luongo, 139 Misc. 840, 249 N.Y.S. 415, 416 (1931).
205. For cases rejecting first amendment contentions, see In re Glenn, 256 Iowa 1233, 130
N.W.2d 672, 675 (1964); State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (1972); In re Fre-
richs, 238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1976). For analyses of the law, see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12,
§ 11.3.2; Note, In re Erdmann: What Lawyers Can Say About Judges, 38 ALA. L. REV. 600
(1974); Note, Restrictions on Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary: A Denial of First Amendment
Rights, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1981). One must also distinguish between a lawyer's
conduct as a lawyer and his conduct as a private citizen. See Polk v. State Bar, 374 F. Supp.
784, 788 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (when acting in private capacity first amendment protects attorney).
206. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 45 (1980); Note, The First Amendment and
Attorney Discipline for Criticism of the Judiciary: The Lawyer Beware, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 129,
130 (1988); Annotation, Licens -g and Regulation of Attorneys as Restricted by Rights of Free
Speech, Expression, and Association Under First Amendment, 27 LAW. En'. 2D 953, 963-68
(1971); Annotation, Attorney's Criticism of Judicial Acts As Grounds for Disciplinary Action, 12
A.L.R. 31) 1408, 1408-38 (1967).
[Vol. 43
ETHICAL CIVIL APPELLATE ADVOCACY
IV. CONCLUSION
In the main, the rules of ethical appellate practice derive from common
sense, prudence, and public policy. 20 7 The appellate attorney must provide
ethical service to his clients and courts in order to maintain the proper func-
tioning of the appellate system.
207. See Drinker, supra note 36, at 375 (good statement of attributes of the ethical lawyer).
1989]

